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ABS TRAC T 
This dissertation examines the issue cost of public  ut ility debt 
sold publicly and privately from June 1 9 7 9  to December 1 983 and deter­
mines : ( 1 )  whether private and public debt have the same is sue cost 
f or f irms who substitute between private p lacements and public sales 
( switch hitters) , ceteris paribus ; (2 ) whether issue cost differences 
between public issues and p rivate placements by switch hit ters vary 
with the degree of ma rket uncertainty ; (3) whether firms who do not 
subst itute between p rivate  p lacements and public sales (non-switch 
hitters) choose to is sue deb t  privately because the agency costs of  
debt can be resolved less  expensively in the private market than in 
the public market; and ( 4 )  whether the benefits which non-switch 
hitters obtain from issuing privately increase as agen cy costs of debt 
increase . 
The dissertation ' s findings suggest that for switch hitters , there 
is no cost difference on average between public issues and private 
p lacements sold during our test period . This finding suggests that 
switch hitters view the two methods of sale as close substitutes .  
However ,  when credit  market conditions are uncertain the results are 
much d if feren t .  During peri ods of volat ile interest rat es such as 
1 980- 1 98 1 , switch hitter s  can save an average of 49  basis points by 
issuing debt private ly rather than pub licly. This c o st saving was not 
evident during more stable periods such as 1 9 7 9  III and 1983 .  
The results of  the tests on  non-swit ch hitters support an economi c  
rat ionale for the existence o f  the private placement market .  The tes t s  
v 
indicate that below investment grade issues by non-switch hit ters would 
have h ad sub stantially higher issue costs had they been sold publicly . 
Further , the findings show that the cost advantage of  private p l ace­
ments over public issues increases as a gency costs of debt increase .  
For investment grade non-switch hitters , the tests indicate no cost 
difference between private p lacements and public issue s ;  presumably , 
these firms could have issued publicly without incurring additional 
issue cost s . However ,  these f irms sell their debt private ly because 
their issues are too small to enj oy a successful public sale . 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is con troversy between academics and corporate financial 
of ficers over whether private p lacement of new issues of corporate debt 
1 is  more expensive than publ ic sal e .  Academics present empirical evi-
dence which suggests  that issuing debt p rivately is more costly than 
issuing publicly .  Pract itioners counter that there are good reasons 
for issuing debt privately and when their firms do s o ,  they are get t ing 
2 something in return for the higher yields they pay. 
Research by Cohan [ 1 4 ] , Wolf [ 66 ] , and Zwick [ 68 ]  indicates that 
private yields exceed pub lic yields on average . These studies argue 
that the private placeme nt market exists primarily to s e rve smaller  
companies with relat ively high default ris k and that some of these 
borrowers (non-switch hitters) do not have the ab ility to sub s t itute 
between publ ic and private issues of deb t .  Other firms which are larg-
er and have a higher credit s t anding ( switch hitt ers )  are able to sub-
stitute  between markets . For these firms ,  the decision to sell debt 
privately or publicly should be determined by wh ich method of sale is 
least expens ive . Wolf empirically verified t hat some firms are less  
1 A private placement is a method of issuing new debt in which the 
i ssuer s ells the securities directly to the ultimate investor .  In 
public is sue s ,  an underwriter purchases the securities from the issuer 
and then resells them to the public . 
2 This knowledge comes from dis cus sion with a corporate financial 
of ficer and an investment banker who advises on private p lacement s .  
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able to  subs titute than others by showing that his sample of large, 
financially secure firms (taken from the Fortune 500) were more sensi­
t ive to  the yield spread between public  and private markets than small­
e r ,  riskier firms regarding t he decision to  issue deb t privately. 
Thus , these studies ( [ 1 4 ] , [ 6 6 ] , [ 68 ] )  may have found private place­
ments more expensive than pub l ic sales because private i s sues have 
higher  default  risk than public is sues , on average . 
For firms that are able to subst itute between private placement s 
and public issues these empirical results are at odds with economic 
theory for two reason s .  Firs t ,  if private p lacement is consistently 
more expensive than public is suance , why would any firm who has a 
choice cho o se the more expens ive method of sale? Second , in the ab­
s ence of capital market imperfections , me thod of sale should not affect 
new is sue borrowing costs because private p lacement s  and publ ic issues 
would be perfect substitutes . On the other hand , for firms unable t o  
sub stitute between private placements and public issue s , there are good 
economic reasons for issuing privately because it is easier and less 
expensive to resolve debt-related agenc y problems with a private place­
ment than with a public sale . 
Purpose of the D i ssertation 
This d is sertation expla:f.ns t he observed issue cost differences 
between the private and public deb t markets and shows that the cost 
difference can be accounted for by d i f f erences  in f i rm characteri s t ics , 
:f.ssue character is t ic s  and market cond i tions . Previous studies were 
unable to account for  these differences either because they used 
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aggregate economic data or because they lacked detailed information 
about the characterist ics of ind iv idual private placement s .  In either 
c ase , it is  no t poss ible to make i s sue cost comp arisons ho lding all 
other factors constan t ;  thu s , any cost differences found in previous 
studies may be stati s t ical artifact s of  misspecified empirical models . 
Because we gathered detailed informat ion about private placements from 
quest ionnaires sent to the issuer s , we are able to use mul t iple re­
gression to hold f i rm characterist ics , issue characterist ics, and mar­
ket cond i t ions constant . This dissertat ion examines the is sue cost of 
pub l ic ut ility debt sold publicly and privately from June 1 979 t o  De­
cember  1 98 3  and determines : ( 1 )  whether private and pub l i c  debt have 
the same issue cost for swit ch hitters, ceteris paribus;  (2 )  whether 
issue cost d ifferences  between public issues and p r ivate placements by 
switch hitters vary wi th the degree of  market uncertainty ; (3 ) whether 
non-switch hitters choose to issue deb t privately becaus e they agency 
costs of debt can be resolved less expensive ly in the private market 
than in the public market ;  and ( 4 )  whether the benef its which non­
switch hit ters obtain from issuing private ly increase as agency cost s  
of  debt increase .  
Summary of the Findings 
The d issertation ' s f indings suggest that for switch hitters , there 
is  no statist ically s ignificant cost difference on ave rage between 
public issues and private placements sold over the ent ire test perio d . 
This f inding suggests that switch hitters view the two methods of sale 
as close subst itutes . However ,  when credit market conditions are 
4 
uncertain the results  are much different . During periods of  volatile 
interest rates such as 1 980-1 98 1 ,  switch hitters can save an average of 
4 9  basis points by issuing d ebt privately rather than publicly . This 
cost s aving was not evident during more stable periods such as 1 979 III 
and 1 98 3 . 
The results of  the tests on non-switch hitters supports an econom­
ic rationale for the exist ence of  the private placement marke t .  The 
tests indicate that below inves tment grade is sues by non-switch hitters 
would have had subs tantially higher issue costs had they been sold 
publicly.  Further, the findings show that the cost advant age of pri­
vate placement over public issues increases as agency costs of debt 
increase .  For investment grade non-switch hitters , the tests indicate 
no cost difference between private placements and pub l ic issue s ;  pre­
sumably ,  these firms could have is sued publicly without incurring addi­
t ional issue cos t s . However ,  these firms s ell  their debt privately 
because their issues are too small to  enj oy a successful public sale . 
Organiz ation of the D i�sertat ion 
Chapter 2 describes the market for privately placed debt. Chap­
ter  3 develops theoretical reasons for why there may be issue cos t 
differences between publicly and privately issued de bt .  Chapter 4 
reviews past emp irical studies of  the cost difference between public 
issues and private placement s ,  develops the empirical model to test the 
d issertation's hypotheses , and describes the data. Chapter 5 ,  test s 
the hypotheses and discusses the f indings . Finall y ,  Chapter 6 summa­
rizes the d issertation and draws conclusions from the f indings . 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MARKET FOR PRIVATELY PLACED DEBT 
This chapter: ( 1) discusses the origin and development of the 
private placement market; ( 2) discusses the borrowers and lenders in 
the private placement market; ( 3) describes how a private placement 
deal is conducted; and ( 4) discusses the distinguishing characteristics 
3 of the private placement market .  The next chapter presents theoret-
ical arguments for why private placements and public issues have dif-
ferent issue costs . 
Origin and Development of the 
Private Placement Market 
The private placement is a method of issuing new debt securities 
in which ( 1) the issuer and the investor directly negotiate the terms 
of the issue, and (2) title to the securities passes directly to the 
investor . 4 Since the 1 9 30s, private placements have been an important 
means of raising capital in the United States. Today, nearly 40 per-
cent of all corporate debt is issued privately. We now discuss the 
early history and development of the private placement market. 
3 The discussion in this chapter is a synthesis of much institu-
tional detail surrounding the private placement market . For more 
information, the reader is referred to Corey [ 1 6], Investment Dealer's 
Digest [ 3 1], Kidder, Peabody, and Co . { 40], and Shapiro and Wolf [ 5 3]. 
4 The negotiation may take place with or without a financial 
advisor such as an investment banker . 
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Early History of the Private P lacement Market 
The private placement market be came act ive in the early 1 930s. 
Development s  on both the demand and supply sides of corporate deb t 
markets s t imulated the use of private p lacements as investment vehicles 
for institutional investors and as a means of  f inancing for corpo-
rat ions . 
On the demand side , the growth of  large inst itutional investors 
beginning in the 1 920s  mirrored the growth of the private placement 
marke t .  Table 1 shows the growth in l ife insurance company assets 
between 1 920  and 1 95 0 .  During this period income of life insurance 
companies increased from $ 1 . 8  billion in 1 920 to  $ 1 0 . 3  b illion in 1 94 9. 
Thu s , there was substantial growth in life insurance company cash f lows 
relative to corporate debt available for investment . Also , life insur-
ance companies had a compet itive edge in supplying funds in the private 
p lacement market  because they had large amounts of money available for 
investment .  Unt il the 1 950s , f ew other firms had the assets or cash 
f lows necessary to lend large amounts of money to p rivate borrowers . 
In the early 1 95 0 s , pension funds began competing with life insurance 
companies as a supplier of  funds in the private placement market .  Both 
Shapiro and Wolf [ 5 3 ], and Longstreet and Hess  [ 45 ]  agree that the 
private p lacement became an important means of corporate financing 
because of the in stitut ionalization of s avings and the result ing large 
5 amounts of cash availab le for investment by ins titut ional investor s .  
5 Shapiro and Wol f  [5 3] also s tate that a sh ift in acquisitions o f  
corporate bonds from individuals t o  life insurance companies prec ipi­
t ated private p lacements .  
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TABLE 1 
T OTAL AS SETS OF U.S. L I FE INSURANCE COMPANIES: 
1920-1950 
Total Assets 
Year ($ billions) 
1920 $7.3 
1930 18.9 
1935 23.2 
1940 30.8 
1945 44.8 
1950 64.0 
Sources: Corey [16, p. 17], and Cohan [15, Table X, p. 32]. 
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On the supply side , the enactment o f  t he S ecurities Act of  1 933  
6 s t imulated f i rms to issue debt by private placement . T he act ,  which 
was designed to protect t he unsophisticated investo r ,  increased t he 
costs and inconvenience of  issuing deb t publicly because public  issues 
had to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis sion (SEC) . 
The SEC exempted private placements from the registration requirement 
because "the issues presumab ly would be sold to a small number of in-
s t itutional investors who had the capacity to invest igate t he security 
7 and t he issuer before purchasing . " The passage of  t he S ecurities Act 
of  1 933 coincides with a considerab le increase in t he amount of  privat e 
placements relative to total new bond issue s .  8 S c ho lars generally 
agree t hat this s harp increase in the relative amount of private p lace-
ments is attributab le to t he costs of complying wit h  S EC registrat ion 
and d isclosure requirements . 9 
Development of the Private Placement Market 
Use of the private p lacement increased steadily from t he passage 
o f  the S ecurities Act of 1 933  until 1 95 0 .  The dollar volume o f  pri-
vate placements as a percentage of  total debt of ferin gs grew from 
6 S ee d is cussion by S hapiro and Wolf [ 5 3 ] , Longstreet and Hess  
[ 45 ] , and Jarrell [ 33 ] . 
7 Shapiro and Wo lf [ 5 3 ] , p .  2 .  
8 See study by Jarrell [ 3 3 ] . 
9 See Shapiro and Wol f  [ 53 ] , Longs treet and Hess [ 45 ] , and Jarrell 
[ 33 ] . 
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1 0  0 . 2  percent in 1 9 33 to 45.3 percent i n  1 95 0 .  This growth i s  attrib-
utable to the advantages of issuing debt privately , which are ( 1 )  the 
absence o f  registrat ion and disclosure requirement s for private p l ace-
ments, ( 2) the flexibili ty of the private loan agreement ,  and ( 3) low 
flotation costs of private placements as compared with public issues. 1 1  
The percentage of private p lacements to total issues declined from 
1 2  5 7 . 1  percent in 1 95 1  t o  27 . 8  percent in 1 9 5 8 .  This decline in growth 
re sult ed from the decline in t he growth of li fe insurance company cash 
flows relative to  the growth o f  the supp ly o f  corporate debt . Th is 
increase in relative supply caused the yield d ifferenti al between pub-
lie  issues and private placement s to widen so that public sales became 
much less expensive than private sale s. 
From the early 1 960s to 1 98 3, the vo lume of private placement s has 
steadily increased while the private placement market ' s share of total 
debt financing cont inues to de cline . Table 2 shows that during the mid 
1 970s p rivate placement market share increased significant ly over the 
1 960s and early 1 970s; however , the market share never reached the high 
levels attained during the 1 950s.  There are two recent development s  in 
the capital mark�ts which may result in a further decline in the use o f  
private placement s. First , the private placement is in compet ition 
with f inancial innovations of the 1 980s such as the j unk bond market 
1 0  See study b y  Jarrell  [ 33] . 
1 1  See Cohan [ 14 ] , pp . 1 5- 1 6 .  
1 2  See studies by Cohan [ 1 5 ]  and Atkinson [ 4 ] . 
1 0  
TABLE 2 
PRI VAT E PLACEMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
DEBT OFFERINGS: 1 9 73-1 983 
Total Debt Private P r ivate P lace ment s  a s  
Offerings Placement s  a Percent o f  Total 
Period ($  billions) ($ billions) (%) 
1 973 $ 1 9 . 1  $ 5 . 7  2 9 . 8  
1 974 36 . 9  9 . 6  2 6 . 0  
1 975  4 8 . 8 1 1 . 8  24 . 2  
1 976  5 2 . 4  20 . 5  39 . 1  
1 97 7  5 1 . 3  2 3. 7 4 6 . 2  
1 97 8  45 . 1  2 1 . 7  48. 1 
1 979 48 . 4 1 9 . 5  40 . 3  
1 980 5 6 . 1  1 4 . 5  25 . 8  
1 981 6 3 . 7 1 6 . 7  2 6 . 2  
1 9 82 68 . 5  1 8. 6 2 7 . 2  
1 983 80 . 3  2 9 . 6  36 . 9  
S ources: Hawkins [ 2 6 ,  Table I ,  P• 5 7),  and Kidde r ,  Peabody , and 
Co . [ 40 ,  Market Revie w, 1 98 1- 1 983] . 
1 1  
1 3  and adj u stab le rate preferred stock . S econd , large corporations can 
achieve the speed of issuance of the private placement by issuing secu-
rities publicly under the recently adopted S EC Rule 4 1 5  ( shelf regis-
1 4  tration) . 
Borrowers in the Private Placement Market 
There are two types of borrowers in the private placement market . 
First , there are large , well-known firms with high credit st anding who 
substitute between public issues and private placement s. We call these 
i ssuers switch hitters. S econd , there are small ,  risky companie s  who 
do not sub sti tute  between pub l ic issues and private p lacement s.  We 
call these issuers non-switch hitters. 
The traditional role of the private placement market has been to 
serve the long-term financing needs of non-switch h itters. There are 
three reasons that non-switch hitters choose to con fine their borrowing 
to the private placement marke t .  First , because the se firms are smal l ,  
they on ly need to issue small amounts o f  debt a t  one· t ime . Flotat ion 
cost s  for a private p lacement are much lower than for a public i ssue; 
and becau se these costs are fixed with respect to  issue size ,  firms 
with smal l  issues tend toward the private placement market .  
Second , non-switch hitters may have unusual borrowing needs. In 
particular ,  borrowers with extremely r i sky proj ects may find i t  
1 3  S e e  Kidder , Peabody , and Co . [ 40 ,  1 983, p .  1 }. 
1 4  Rule 4 1 5 allows a fi rm t o  register all securities it plans to 
i ssue over the next 2 years and put them on the "shel f," from which 
they may be issued at the firm' s convenience . 
1 2  
d ifficu lt to include nonstandard provisions in the indenture o f  a 
public bond issue without sacr ificing marketab i lity . On the other 
hand , lenders in the private p ,lacement market may be more willing to  
accept unusual features in  the indenture .  In fac t,  some non-switch 
hitters may confine their borrowing to  the private placement market 
becau se they find it prohibitive ly expensive to adhere to standardized 
p rovisions in pub lic bond indentures. Cohan [ 1 4 ]  state s  that the 
private  p lacement market grew large ly because 
certain types o f  unconvent ional ventures have been able to  
obtain financing that wou ld not  have been so readily avail­
able , and might not have been available , e lsewhere . The 
financial inst itutions are able to provide the "custom tai­
loring" service becau se they enter the market as ultimate 
purchasers ( i . e . , they are not who le salers as are investment 
b ankers), and they are free there fo re to  buy i ssues on the 
merits thereo f, without regard to whatever fashions, tra­
d it ions15 or prejudices may dominate the pub lic securities market .  
F inally , non-switch hitters may borrow in the p rivate p lacement 
market because they can do so less expensively than in the public mar -
ket . Cohan present s  evidence that yields on low qua lity issues tend t o  
be lower in the private p lacement market than in the public marke t .  He 
explains this seeming paradox by a sserting that private p lacement 
lenders have a pre ference for these higher yield ing , low quality is-
sues, and hence may o ffer somewhat lower  yields to the se borrowers to  
1 6  entice them away from the.public market .  
1 5  Cohan [ 1 5 ,  pp . 5-6 ] . 
1 6  Cohan [ 1 5 ,  pp . 22-23]. 
1 3  
Switch hitters shift their borrowing activity from public market s  
to  private markets i f  they f ind private yield s, net o f  f lotation cost s ,  
to  b e  lower than public yields. Thu s ,  these i ssuers are seeking to  
employ the least c o st ly method o f  selling their securitie s. The abil­
ity to directly negotiate the terms o f  the loan agreement does not 
attract these borrowers to  the private p lacement marke t .  Switch 
hitters emp loy standard provisions in their private p lacement loan 
agreements so that their private issues are almo st ident ical to their 
public i ssues. The cost savings to switch hitters occur  because they 
typically make large issues and are able to take advantage o f  economie s 
of  scale in flotation costs.  
Lenders in the P rivate Placement Market 
The composit ion of lenders in the private p lacement market i s  
determined b y  regulatory restrict ions surrounding investment in private 
placement s. The Securities Act of 1 933 o fficially recogniz ed private 
placement s and st ipulated that they only be sold to sophist icated in­
vestors. Sophist icated investors are pre sumed to be able to undertake 
intelligent credit  analysis and to bear the risk a ssociated with their 
investment decisions.  Furthe r ,  the act limits the number of  inve stors 
in a private placement . Thus ,  virtually all private placement s are 
purchased by the fifty largest life insurance companie s. Smal ler 
amount s  are purchased by smaller  insurance companies and pension funds, 
and more recently by commercial banks and savings and loan associ a­
t ions. 
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Inst itut ional investors are  at tracted to the private placement for  
three reasons.  First , institut ional investors prefer larger issues 
because the to tal cost of  performing a credit analysis i s  fixed regard­
less of  the size of  the issue . Thus, the per dollar cost of credit 
analysis is lowe r ,  the larger the issu e .  
Secon d ,  institut ional inve stors are attracted to  the private 
p lacement market because a more complete credit analysis of the pro­
posed security is p ossible than in a publ ic offe ring . In the p rivate 
market , the investor deals direc t ly with the issuer and thus, may have 
access to more informat ion about the issuer than in the public mar ket . 
Finally , these institutions have low effective tax rates and are 
attracted by the higher before-tax yields in the private placement 
market . These higher yields are accompanied by the greater default 
risk of private placements on average, but investors perceive that the 
effective risk they bear i s  lower because of the tailor-made terms and 
provisions of the loan agreement . While the i s suer u se s  tailor-made 
terms to p rovide for unique situations, the institut ional investor can 
negotiate for more protective feature s. Also , because the investor  
conducts a detailed cred i t  analysis, there is l e ss uncert ainty about 
the actual default risk of the issuer than if they relied on bond 
rat ings. On the other hand , de fault risk on rated public issues varies 
widely within bond rating categories.  
Bringing a Private Placement to Market 
Once firms decide to issue debt privately , they assess the 
availability of funds;  determine which inst itutional investors are 
1 5  
currently lending act ively ; analyze the types o f  securities that inves-
tors are current ly demanding; and forecast what level of interest rate s 
1 7  will attract investment .  From this analysis, firms compi le a list o f  
prospect s  whom they plan t o  contact about invest ing in their p rivate 
issue s,  and design the characterist ics of the ir issue s. 
The specifics of  the p ropose issue are included in what is called 
the private p lacement memorandum. This document is al so referred to  as 
1 8  a financing memorandum or an offering c ircula r .  The memorandum i s  
analogous to a prospectus i n  a public issue and i s  prepared b y  the 
issuer ,  usually with the he lp of the investment banker advising on the 
placement . The preparation of the document is usually accomplished in 
a f ew weeks. Included in the memorandum are : ( 1 )  a description of  the 
i ssue t o  include amount , interest rate , payment schedule , offering 
price and maturi ty dat e ;  ( 2) an outline of the redemption features such 
as call provisions or sinking fund requirement s; ( 3 )  a list ing o f  re-
strictive covenants;  (4) a desc rip tion of how the proceeds of the issue 
will be used ; and (5) any relevant informat ion on the financial 
strength of the f irm--e . g . , annual reports,  proxy statement s ,  or earn-
i . i 1 9  ngs proJect  ons. 
Once the private placement memorandum is prepared , the firm or its  
adviser will begin contacting potential lenders by  telephone . Over the 
1 7  Much of this section i s  summarized from Davey [ 1 7 ] • 
1 8 s D [ 1 7  9 ]  ee avey , p .  • 
1 9 see D avey [ 1 7 ,  pp. 10-1 1 ] .  
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phone , the prospec t ive purchasers are given a brief verb al de script ion 
o f  the issue. If the potential invest ors express interest , they are 
immediately sent a copy of  the memorandum. If after examining the 
memorandum the investor is int erested in the issue , he contac t s  the 
i ssuer and negot iations over  the interest rate and covenants begin . 
If  negotiat ions are successful and a preliminary agreement i s  
reached the prosp ec t ive lender undertakes a detailed credit analysis o f  
the f irm. A typical investigation include s  an analysis o f  informat ion 
in the memorandum and the f inancial statements,  meetings with the firm 
manager s, and inspection of the f irm' s physical a sset s. 
If the lender is sat isfied with the results of the credit analy-
sis, a f inal meeting between the firm ' s management and the lender take s 
place . During this meeting the interest rate is agreed upon and the 
other terms of the agreement are set t led.  The date of this final meet-
ing is the commitment date (also calle d  the circle date) and is the day 
upon which the interest rate is set and the delivery of funds is com-
20 mitte d .  Actual delivery of the funds may t ake place from one week to  
six month s after  the  funds are  committed . The  delivery date is known 
as the t akedown date . The issuer may take down the entire amount o f  
the issue at one t ime or may take down port ions of the issue o n  several 
different dates.  
Once the terms are agreed upon , a for�al loan agreement is drawn 
up by independent attorneys retained by the investor ,  but approved and 
20 The entire process may be completed within a week or it may t ake 
up to 90 days,  depending on whether the borrower has issued privately 
before . 
paid by the issuer .  
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2 1  Mo st loan agreement s  contain five sec t ions. The 
f irst sec t ion describes the agreement--sp ecifying the amount borrowed , 
the intere st rat e ,  and the takedown dates. The second sec tion spec-
ifies the details of  any prepayment provisions, to include the call 
provi sion and sinking fund requirement s. The next section include s 
affirmat ive covenants which specify certain act s  to  be performed by the 
borrower over the term of  the loan . These acts might include the de-
livery of  quarterly f inancial st atements to the lender  or  the mainte-
nance of  property insurance .  The fourth section include s  the negative 
covenant s which specify certain acts not permitt ed by the borrowe r .  
Negative c ovenan t s  include d ividend restrictions or  restrictions on 
sub sequent issuance of senior deb t .  The f inal sect ion includes a vari-
ety of items: ( 1 ) default remedies,  ( 2 )  agreement by the lender not to 
resell the debt publicly ,  ( 3) procedures for changing the loan agree-
ment , (4 )  agreement by the borrower to pay le.gal fee s, and printing and 
engraving fees,  and (5)  definit ions of key terms used in the negative  
covenant s. 
D i stinguishing Character istics of  Private Placement s 
There are several characterist ic s  which dist inguish the private 
p lacement from a typical pub lic debt issue.  First , the private market 
is much more personal than the public marke t .  In a private placement 
the borrower and lender meet face t o  face to bargain over the interest 
2 1  This description of the loan agreement i s  summarized f rom 
Zinbarg [67 ] .  
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rate and to negotiate the terms of the loan agreement .  Also , the pri­
vate borrower deal s with a single lender or  a very small group o f  
lenders.  A s  a result ,  i t  is much easier t o  renegotiate the terms o f  
the loan agreement . The renegotiat ion o f  terms i s  a p ract ical impos­
sibility for a widely held pub l ic issue . 
Second , an investment banker plays a different role in a private 
p lacement than in a public issue . In the private p lacemen t ,  the in­
ve stment banker serve s  as an adviser.  At no t ime does the inve stment 
banker bear the risk of an unsuccessful sale because he never t akes 
title to  the securities. This risk i s  born entirely by the private 
issuer .  In contrast , in a public sale,  the investment banker serve s  a s  
an underwriter . I f  the underwriter i s  unsuccessful in resel ling the 
issu e ,  he mu st abso rb the securities into his own inventory . 
Third , flotat ion costs are lower for a private placement than for 
a public i ssu e .  Compensat ion to investment bankers i s  lower for pri­
vate placement s because no underwriting t akes place and becau se 
originat ion services are less detailed than in pub l ic sales. Further , 
S EC registration i s  not required for privately placed issues.  Other 
sources of cost savings include lower print ing and engraving cost s, no 
requirement for certi fied financial statements and thus no accountant ' s 
fee s, and fewer legal expense s .  
Fourth , the actual transfer of funds can b e  completed much more 
quickly in a private placement than in a public sale .  The private 
placement agreement can be consummated in a few days to a few weeks 
depending on how much negotiat ion is required . A public offering t akes 
1 9  
up t o  90 days and may take as long a s  six months t o  ge t S EC approval . 
However ,  with the recent adoption o f  S EC Rule 4 1 5  the problem of an 
extended wait ing period may be avo ided if the issuer chooses to regis­
ter securities under this rule .  
Final ly , private placements o ffer more flexibility than public 
debt i ssue s  for three reasons.  First , there is great flexibili ty of 
negot iation over terms and provisions afforded the borrower.  Borrower s  
are able to  explain directly to investors unique problems and sit -
uat ions which cannot b e  easily explained in a prospectus. In some 
cases,  the borrower may desire to c ommunicate more information to po­
tent ial lenders than i s  permitted in a prosp ectus required for public 
o fferings. On the other hand , firms may desire to borrow privately to 
p revent the widesp read dissemination o f  sensitive informat ion that 
might be required for public offerings. 
S econd , p rivate lenders may be more amenable to unusual covenants 
in the  indenture . Inclusion of unusual covenants in a public issue may 
j eopardize the successful sale o f  the issue , or even result  in a higher 
interest rat e .  This "custom tailoring" may be easier to obtain for 
private issues since investors are few and can easily be shown the 
firm ' s proj ects or be introduced to the company officers. 
Finally , the borrower can get a fi rm commitment on the terms o f  
the agreement at the conclusion of negotiation s. Thus,  the borrower i s  
certain of the proceeds o f  the i ssue well  befo re the actual sale date . 
There is al so flexibility as to when the funds are " taken do wn" (taken 
possession of) --all o f  the funds may all be taken down at once or  they 
20 
may be  taken down serially in which case the p rivate placement debt 
issue is similar to a line of credi t .  Takedown f lexibility is impor­
tant since it allows the firm to match the timing of its borrowing to  
meet the cash flow requirement s  of i t s  proj ect s. The  terms and pro­
visions of a private placement loan agreement can al so be renegotiated 
over the life of the issu e .  Thi s  opportunity may be  valuable for 
small , risky borrowers who encounter unexpected p roblems with specific 
proj ect s. The option to renegotiate is seldom used by large r, more 
f inancially secu re issuers. 
Summary 
The private p lacement market developed in the 1 930s in response to 
the inst itut ionalizat ion of  savings and to  the inc reased cost of issu­
ing debt publicly under the regist rat ion and disclosure requirements o f  
the Secu rities Act of  1 933. Bo rrowers in the p rivate pl acement market 
are c lassi fied as switch hitters o r  non-switch hit ters. Swi t ch hitters 
are large firms of high c redi t  quality who sub stitute between public 
issues and private p lacements .  Non-switch hitters are small ,  risky 
f i rms who do not sub stitute between markets.  Private lenders are the 
large institut ional inve stors: life insurance companies and pension 
funds. These lende rs are attracted by high after-tax yields, the op­
portunity to purchase large bloc ks of securities, and the benefits of  a 
more detailed credit analysis. The p rivate placement market is dist in­
guished from the publ ic debt market by the f ollowing characte ri st ic s: 
( 1 )  a more personal relat ionship betwe en borrowers and lenders; ( 2 )  a 
2 1  
lesser role played by the investment banker; ( 3) lower flotation costs; 
( 4) speedier issuance of securities; and, ( 5) greater flexibility in 
the design and renegotiation of the issues . 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY OF COST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT ISSUES 
This chapter develops theoretical reasons for issue cost differ­
ences between public and private issues of debt . In perfect capital 
markets, there would be no cost difference between the two methods of 
sale. If buyers and sellers are price takers and have equal and cost­
less access to all relevant information, and if there are no frictions 
such as taxes or transactions costs, then the private placement and the 
public issue would be perfect substitutes and the law of one price 
would prevail. However, there are several market imperfections which 
may cause private placements to differ in issue cost from public is­
sues . 
There are conflicting theoretical arguments as to which method of 
sale is more costly. In the first section, search and marketability 
differences suggest that private placements may be more expensive. The 
second section discusses how inexpensive resolution of agency problems 
in the private market result in lower issue costs for private place­
ments. In the third section we resolve the conflicting arguments by 
recognizing the existence of two types of private borrowers--those who 
substitute between public issues and private placements, and those who 
do not . The fourth section examines the impact of bond market con­
ditions on the cost difference between private placements and public 
sales . In the final section we state the testable hypotheses which 
follow from the theory of cost differences. 
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Private Placements versus 
Public Issues of Debt 
As discussed above, there are conflicting arguments as to whether 
private placements or public issues are more expensive . We first dis-
cuss how search and marketability favor public issues. Then we discuss 
how agency costs and flotation costs favor private placements. 
Factors Favoring Public Sales 
Search theory. The intensity of competition is an important de-
terminant of new issue borrowing costs. Kessel [ 39 J used Stigler's 
[58] economics of information to show why increased underwriting compe-
titian leads to increased search, which reduces borrowing costs . The 
knowledge of the demand for an issue is not completely known to any 
single investment banker. What an investment banker does know, howev-
er, is reflected in the price offered for a security. Since underwrit-
ers serve different customers, the offering yields at which they can 
sell an issue vary. Therefore, as the number of competing bidders 
increases, so does the chance of finding the underwriter whose custom-
ers are willing to accept the lowest offering yield. 
Kessel's arguments are easily extended to the private placement 
market. In a private placement, the borrower may search the market by 
using the services of an underwriter as an agent or finder, or the 
borrower may canvass the market himself . Since borrowers frequently 
hire someone else to perform this function in both private and public 
sales, what matters in Kessel's framework is not who searches the 
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market, but how many prospective lenders the borrower is able to 
contact. In either a public or private sale, the greater the extent of 
the market search, the greater the probability of finding the lenders 
who are willing to accept the lowest yield. If the search for poten-
tial lenders differs depending on which method of sale the borrower 
uses, issue costs may differ between public sales and private place-
ments. 
Less search takes place in the private placement market than in 
the public market for three reasons. First, Securities and Exchange 
Commission ( SEC) regulations limit a private borrower's search of the 
market by restricting the number of showings of a private placement to 
2 2  potential lenders. Second, search is reduced in the private place-
ment market if the borrower continues to sell issues to the same lend-
er. In this situation, the relationship between the private borrower 
and lender is a recurring client relationship very much like that be-
tween a firm and a commercial bank. Finally, there are fewer potential 
investors in the private placement market than in the public market. 
In the private placement market we know that the major lenders are life 
insurance companies, private pension funds, and state and local govern-
ment pension funds; whereas, in the public market the distribution of 
2 2  A showing is defined as providing a potential lender with the 
name of the borrowing company. See Shapiro and Wolf [53, pp. 87-88]. 
While the SEC has not made a definitive ruling on the permissible 
number of showings, it is generally acknowledged that larger issues 
with standard covenants are permitted a greater number of showings than 
smaller issues with more unusual covenants. However, firms issuing 
privately are careful not to show their issues too many times because 
the issue may lose the registration-exempt status. There are no such 
restrictions for a public issue. 
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23 lenders i s  much more widespread. As a result , search is  less com-
p lete than if all potential lenders could be canvassed . 
In sum, a less complete search of  the private p lacement market 
than the public market means that new issue borrowing costs for private 
placement s  may be greater than costs for co mparable public issues.  
Marketability. Marketab i lity is defined as the ease with which an 
asset can be sold without loss of value. A security' s marketab ility is 
determined by two characteristics .  First , the greater the transact ions 
costs required to sell a securit y, the less marketab le the securi t y. 
Transact ions cost s  include explicit costs  such as broker ' s fees and 
a lso include implicit costs  such as the opportunity costs of time and 
effort spent in attempting to sell the securit y. Second , the greater 
the price risk associated with a security, the less marketable the 
securit y. Price risk is defined as the likelihood that a securit y  will 
be sold at a price other than its int rinsic value. We generally ob-
serve that less marketable securities sell for higher yields to c ompen-
sate investors for the potent ial loss of their resources from trans-
actions costs or price risk. T ypically, securities which enj o y  active 
secondary market s  ( i . e . , where frequent transact ions take place) are 
considered to be more marketable than those with thin secondary 
markets. 
23 See Shapiro and Wolf [5 3] for a dis cussion of  lenders in the 
p rivate placement marke t .  They point out that only inst itutional 
investors have the large amounts of surplus cash necessary to  purchas e 
large blocks of  securities. 
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There are t hree reasons why private p lace ment s  are less  marketab le 
t han comparable public issue s . F irs t ,  SEC regulations restrict the 
resale of  privately placed debt instruments .  T he reason for t hese 
restrictions is t hat an adequate flow of  information is not presumed to 
24 have taken place when a private placement is act ivel y  resold . The 
SEC requires regis t ration of  new issues of  securities to  ensure t hat 
investors receive adequate information about t he nature of t he issuer. 
Private placements are permitted to be sold only to a small number o f  
sophisticated investors who are p resumed able t o  undertake t heir own 
detailed analys is of  t he borrowe r .  To allow unli mited resale of  pri-
vate placements would mean t hat firms would be able to ac hieve de f acto 
public distribution of  t heir securities while avoiding SEC registra-
t ion.  T hus , only under certain restrictive conditions are private 
p lacements allowed to be resold . The resale is not likel y  to be chal-
lenged b y  t he SEC if it results from a c hange in t he lending company' s 
25 investment strategy and if a "sufficient" length of t ime has passed 
since t he initial distribut ion of  t he securitie s . 26 
Second , t he t yp ical private p lacement would be unattractive  t o  
o t her investors even in t he absence o f  regulatory restrict ions . 
Because private p lacements are direc t l y  negot iated , they cont ain 
24 See Shapiro and Wolf  [ 5 3, pp . 7 9 ,  104-109 ] .  
25 Note t hat a c hange in t he issuer ' s financial condition doe s  not 
warrant resale . 
26T here is no definitive ruling b y  t he courts or t he SEC as t o  
what this length of time is . 
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provisions that are suited to the desires of  a parti cular lender  and 
these provisions may not suit the needs of other lenders . 
Final ly , private  placements have l imited marketability be caus e  
they are not rated by a maj or  rating agency such a s  Moody ' s or Standard 
and Poor ' s .  Private p lacements are not rated because lende rs perform 
their own credit analyses of borrowers . On the other hand , bond rat­
ings of public issues enhance marketability because less sophisticated 
investors evaluate a borrower ' s default risk using bond ratin gs instead 
of  condu cting their own credit analysis . A detailed credit analysis 
would be too cos t ly and t ime consuming for less sophisticated , smaller 
investors . Thus , because of lower marketability p r ivate placement s  
tend t o  sell f o r  higher yields than comparable publ i c  issue s . 
Factors Favoring Private Placements 
Agency prob lems may be resolved more  easily in the private market 
than in the public market . S ince agency costs take the form of  explic­
it costs to  the f i rm' s managers and downward valuation of  the firm ' s 
se curit ies , we argue that managers will choose the method of  sale whi ch 
minimize s  these costs . This argument is  consistent with the C o st ly 
Contracting Hypothesis  of Smith and Warner [55 ]  whi ch says that f i rms 
will choose the form of f inancial contract ing whi ch is least cos t ly 
because the managers bear the costs  of resolving agen cy problems . 
There are two debt-related agency problems of con cern here: (1) infor­
mational asymmet ry between borrowers and lenders , and (2) managerial 
incentive effect s  of  debt.  
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Informational asymmetry. The informational asymmetry problem is 
that borrowers know the true characteristics of their firm while poten-
tial lenders do not. Relevant characteristics might be default risk, 
quality of management, or the quality of the firm's investment proj-
ects. Unfortunately, borrowers may not always be truthful about their 
actual characteristics, because "[t]here may be substantial rewards for 
2 7  exaggerating positive qualities." This prevents the direct transfer 
of information between borrowers and lenders . 
We argue that firms issue debt privately to minimize signalling 
costs. For firms with severe agency problems, the third party 
signalling traditionally used in public debt markets may be prohibi-
28 tively expensive. These third party signals include obtaining bond 
2 9  ratings and having the issue certified through the due diligence 
activities of investment bankers . 30 Information processing performed 
by bond rating agencies or investment bankers may be inadequate or too 
2 7 [ ] ·' Leland and Pyle 4 4, p. 37 1 • The rewards of exaggeration exist 
because potential lenders are unable to distinguish between high and 
low quality borrowers. Thus, market prices of debt securities will 
reflect the average quality of borrowers (see Akerlof [ 1]). In this 
situation, low quality firms are unable to sell their debt securities 
at prices greater than warranted. The implication of such behavior is 
that there is likely to be a high proportion of low quality firms 
attempting to borrow because above average firms will leave the market, 
unable to receive a fair price for their securities. If capital 
markets are to continue to function, information about the true quality 
of projects to be financed must be transferred. 
28see study by Thakor [5 9]. 
29see studies by Wakeman [63] and Hsueh [ 30]. 
30see study by Booth and Smith [ 9]. 
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costly t o  serve the  purposes o f  f i rms with great agency problems . 
These firms choose t o  issue debt privately and t ransfer informat ion 
directly to lenders . 
The willingness of a f i rm t o  expend resources t o  obtain a b ond 
rat ing serves as a s ignal of  a f irm ' s qualit y .  Thus, firms who do  not 
purchase ratings may be s ignall ing the market that they are of low 
3 1  quality . F i rms who perceive that they wil l  not obtain an investment 
grade rating may t urn to issuing privately placed debt because they can 
give f i rsthand information to potent ial lenders . Furthermore� borrow-
ers who require unusual t e rms and provisions may f ind it easier to 
communicate with potential lenders dire c t ly .  
Another s ignal of a f irm ' s quality i s  the cert ification o f  a bond 
issue which results  from the due diligence act iv i t ies of investment 
bankers .  During the due diligence process ,  the inves tment banker pro-
duces reliable information about borrowers who p ay for underwrit ing 
services because 
Most companies raise new capital only occasionally , but un­
derwriters are in the business all the t ime . Established 
underwriters are , therefore , worried about their reputation 
and will not handle a new issue unless they believe the facts 
have been presented fairly to investors . Thus , in addition 
to handling the s ale o f  an issue , the underwri ters in effec t 
g ive a "Good Housekeeping S eal of  Approval" t o  it . This 
implied j�dorsement may be worth quite  a bit  to the issuing 
company . 
Investment banke rs may refuse to underwrite f irms with high de fault 
risk or o ther unusual characterist ics to  avo id the risk of  damaging 
3 1  Wakeman [ 6 3 , p .  396 ] . 
3 2  Brealey and Myers [ 10 ,  p .  305 } .  
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their reputations and hence , damaging their ability to issue credible 
s ignal s .  Thus , the private placement serves as an alternat ive to pub-
l ie issuance of securities  where high default risk or unusual circum-
stances surrounding the borrowing f irm make signalling through the use 
of  bond ratings or  underwriting services too cos t ly . In such cases , 
direct informat ion t rans fer is des irable between borrowers and lenders . 
Direct informat ion t rans fer may be  desirable for two reasons . 
Firs t ,  private placement borrowers communicat e the f irm' s s ituation 
33 direc t ly to the lender .  Such informat ion t ransfer would be  diffi cult 
and cos tly for public issues because of  the out-of-pocket cos t s  of  
reading large numbers of potential bondholders and because o f  the p rob-
lems created by moral hazard. Further , the borrower may be more wil l-
ing to reveal relevant information to one or a f ew lenders rather than 
pub licly . Firms may wish t o  protect trade secre t s  or they may want to 
avoid misinte rpretation of  the information by a public  not able to view 
the firm's situation firsthand . 
S e cond , dire c t  information t ransfer may be  desirable because the 
prospectus is an "unwieldy medium" for the communication of informat ion 
to bondholders . Firms elect private issues of debt so that their situ-
ation can be explained to potential lenders more clearly than the 
r egulations surrounding the prospectus allow .  In particular , the SEC 
has been reluctant to permit discussion of  future earnings in a pro-
spectus . 
33  S e e  Corey [ 1 6 ,  p.  5 1 ] . 
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In sum , direct negotiation between borrowers and lenders allows 
for firsthand trans fer of information relevant to the debt issue . 
Thus , the private placement solves the informat ional asymmet ry p robl em 
at costs that are lower than the costs of  signalling through a third 
p arty in a public  sale . 
Incent ive probl ems of deb t .  The use o f  debt in a firm' s capital 
structure gives managers incentive to make subopt imal investment de­
cisions . There are two incentive probl ems of  concern here . First , i f  
the f irm ' s  equity i s  cons idered a European cal l  option o n  the f irm' s 
underlying assets , owner-managers wil l  accept high risk proj ects that 
3 4  increase the value of  the equity a t  the expense o f  the debtholders . 
This occurs b ecause high risk proj ects  increase the variance rate on 
the firm ' s  assets , but decreases the value of the firm ' s  debt because 
of  increased d efault risk. 
S econd , if the firm' s debt matures after the valu e  of  future in­
ves tment opportunities is revealed to be less than the face value of  
the  firm ' s  maturing deb t ,  the managers will  hand the  firm over t o  the 
b ondholders . Thu s , some positive net present value proj ects  are for­
gone because managers only accept proj ects  whose values exc eed the sum 
o f · th e  face value of the firm ' s  debt and the investment outlay . 3
5 
Myers [ 2 5 ]  proposes two possible solut ions to the incentive prob­
lem. First , restrictive covenant s (a form of monitoring costs)  that 
[ 2 2 ] . 
3 4s ee studies by Black and S choles [ 8 ] , and Galai and Masulis 
35 See Myers [ 48 ] . 
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force desired managerial behavior can be  included in  the  bond contrac t . 
S e cond , provisions for renegotiat ion can be put into the contrac t . 
Both of  these measures , while costly , can force managers to accept all  
positive net  present value proj e ct s .  We  argue that these two solut ions 
to incent ive problems are more easily implemented in the private p l ace-
ment market than in the public market . 
Monitoring costs are lower for private placements  than for  publ ic 
issues .  Smith and Warner note that under the Trust Indenture Act of  
1 939 the  provisions for public  is sues of  debt are  restricted in such a 
way nwhich makes the enforcement o f  t ight ly restric t ive covenants very 
36 expensive . "  Private p lacements  generally do  not come unde r  the 
purview of the t rust Indenture Act ;  thu s ,  a trustee may not be required 
for private p lacements .  I t  is typically very expensive to enforce 
t ight ly restric tive covenants through a t rustee , g iven that the rela-
t ionship between bondholders and the trust ee is a principal-agent rela-
t ionship subj ect to  agency probl ems and their related cos t s .  Thus , we 
observe that private p lacements usually involve a higher number of more 
detailed restrict ive covenants than are found in public  issues . The 
implication is that more restrictive covenants are not as expensive to 
enforce on the private p l acement loan agreement . The reason for this 
diffe rence is the personal relat ionship that exists between borrowers 
and lenders in a p rivate placement loan agreement . This relationship 
means that lenders have access to informat ion that may be much more 
36  Smith and Warner [ 5 5 ,  p .  1 25 ] . 
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t imely and d etailed than the information available to the trustee in a 
public issu e .  Thus , covenants on private issues are more eas ily and 
inexpensively enforced ; in fact , Smith and Warner s tate that because o f  
the costs o f  enforcing the t rustee ' s  behavior ,  the covenants o f  a pub-
lie issu e  are not likely to eliminate incent ive effects of debt . 
Therefore , lower monitoring costs are as sociat ed with private place-
ments .  
Renegot iation is much more costly for public is sues than for pri-
vate issue s . In a pub l ic issu e , any breach of the bond covenants i s  
considered def ault . Once a borrower i s  i n  default , drast ic , and per-
haps costly , measures are t aken by the t rustee to p rotect bondholders ' 
interest s .  Assets of the borrower may be seized , or the deb t  may be-
come immediately due and payable . In this case , renegot iation o f  pub-
lie issues may be desirab l e , but it is dif ficult and expensive to rene-
got iate them. Specifically , any change in the covenants has to b e  
approved by the bondholders in that consent i s  required o f  
the holders of  two-thirds in principal amount o f  the out­
s tanding debt • • • •  Moreover ,  the consent of 1 00 percent of 
the debtholders is required in order ff change t he maturity 
date or principal amount of the bonds . 
On the other hand , there is no such problem with the private placement 
for three reasons . Firs t ,  the number of lenders is very small relative 
t o  the number of bondholders in a public issue .  There i s  typically 
only one , or perhaps seve ral , lenders in a privately placed issue . 
Thus , the borrowers avoid the costs  of  contacting thous ands of bond-
3 7  
Smith and Warner [55 , p .  1 5 1 ] . 
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holders in order to obtain approval for some change in the indentur e .  
Second , the renegot iation process  i s  l ike ly to proceed much more 
quickly in the private placement s ince the borrower can deal face-to-
face with the lenders . Finally , the close personal relat ionship 
between lenders and borrowers in the private loan agreement means that 
lenders are more informed about the f irm ' s  act ivities and , thus , may 
even ant icipate a f i rm' s request for a change in the indenture . 
Private p lacement loan agreements are renego t iated o ften . A typi-
cal request  by a borrower for a modificat ion of the original agreement 
is very rarely refused outrigh t . 38  Z inbarg [ 6 7 ]  says that lenders 
generally view the Loan Agreement as a 
destined t o  be modified periodica l ly t o  
changing c ircumstances .  Accordingly , these 
modifications routinely , with no quid pro 
the borrower unless the proposed corp,3lg:ate 
promise the lende r ' s  margin of  safety . 
l iving document 
take account o f  
lenders make most 
quo exact ed from 
action will com-
Private lenders receive an average o f  one modification request  per year 
per private loan agreement , and reques t s  are very rarely denied s ince 
in most cases the "corporat e requests [ are ] perfec t ly reasonable and 
40 [ do )  not increase [ their) risks materially . "  Thus , privately placed 
issues are more eas i ly and inexpens ively renegotiated than public is-
sue s .  
F lotation cos t s . Besides inexpensive resolution of  agency prob-
lems , the most important advantage o f  private placements  over public 
38  S e e  Atamian [ 2 ] . 
3 9  Zinbarg [ 6 7 ,  p .  35 ] .  
40  Z inbarg [ 6 7 ,  p .  35 ] . 
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sales is  lower flotation cos t s .  Lower flotation costs  tend to make 
issue costs for private  p lacements  lower than those for public is sue s .  
The fact that f lotat ion costs are lower for private issues has long 
4 1  been recognized and is  wel l  documented . 
There are several sources of lower f lo t at ion costs for private 
placements .  First , the inves tment banker in the private placement 
p lays a dif ferent role than the investment banker in a publ ic issue . 
In a public offering , the distribut 1.on and ortginat ion services provid-
ed by the investment banker are more detailed and complet e ,  and hence 
more cost ly . In a private placement the investment banke r  does not 
take t i t le to the securities ;  therefore , he does not bear the risk o f  
an unsuccessful sale and , thus , requires less compensation than what 
would be rece ived in a publ ic o f ferin g .  Second , S EC registrat ion i s  
not required for privately placed is sues . Finally , other sources o f  
cost s avings include lower printing and engraving cost s ,  no require-
ments for cert ified f inancial statements , and thus , no accountant ' s  
fee s ,  and fewer legal expenses .  
Resolution of the Conflicting Theoret ical Arguments :  
Swi t ch Hit ters and Non-Switch HHters 
The conflicting theoretical arguments above leave us with no c lear 
answer as to  whether private p lacements are more or less expensive than 
pub l ic issues . However , by recogniz ing that there are two types of  
private borrowers ,  we  readily resolve the conflic t .  As  d iscussed in 
4 1see Shapiro and Wolf [ 5 3 ] , Corey [ 1 6 ] , SEC [ 5 2 ] , and Smith [ 54 ] . 
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Chapter 2,  there are two types of private issuers . On one hand , large , 
well-known issuers with high credit standing who subst itute between 
private p lacements and public issues are switch hitters . On the other 
hand , small ,  ris ky issuers who do not substitute between private plac e­
ments and public  is sues are non-switch hitter s .  
Swit ch hitters issue debt b y  private placement when they observe 
that private yields , net of flotation costs ,  are lower than public 
yields . The ir decision to issue privately is not motivated by lower 
agency costs  of private borrowing because their characteristic s  ( low 
default r isk,  large f irm size) determine their ability to subst itute 
between the two markets . Be cause switch hit t ers us e the same s t an­
dardiz ed provisions in their bond contracts in both marke t s ,  the bene­
fits of direct negotiation with lenders are of l imit ed usefulness for 
these borrowers . In this cas e ,  their relat ionship with lenders i s  
"arm ' s length . n  Thus , switch hitters are att racted to the private 
market by lower private yields s ince f lotation costs  are relat ively 
fixed . 
Non-switch hitters choose to borrow privately because they can 
resolve the agency costs of debt more inexpensively than if they issued 
pub licly . When they issue private pl acement deb t , these issuers sacri­
f ice the benefits of greater search and marketability in public mar­
kets . On the other hand , these f irms have a great deal to gain in 
terms of lower borrowing costs in that they will bear lower agency 
costs because of advantages of direct information t ransfer between 
borrowers and lenders and because o f  lower costs  of monitoring and 
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renego tiation . Thus , there is  a t rade-off  between the benefits o f  
public and private borrowing . Presumably , since non-switch hitters 
elect t o  do their borrowing privately , the benefits of private place-
ment must  outweigh its detriment s .  Furthe r ,  the more pronounced a 
firm' s agency problems , the greater are the benefits o f  is suing debt 
privately rather than publicly . 
The Effect of  Market Conditions on the Cost  Difference 
Between Private P lacements  and Publ ic S ales 
A switch hitter ' s cho ic e  between public and private markets de-
pends on the issue cost d if ference s ;  therefore , market conditions will 
affect  their decision. Market  conditions should not affect a 
non-switch hit ter ' s decision t o  issue private ly because we presume that 
they may be unable to subs titute between marke ts due t o  agency prob-
lems . Market uncertainty af fects  the issue cost of new debt securitie s  
4 2  in two ways . Firs t ,  in public sales of d eb t ,  an increase in uncer-
t ainty about interes t  rate movement s increases the price risk of an 
underwriter ' s inventory of securitie s .  This increase in underwriting 
r isk means that investment bankers wil l  increase spread s ,  reoffer 
yields or both as compensat ion. Second , market uncertainty increases 
informat ion costs for  issuers and investors . I ssuers canvass the 
market to f ind the highest  bidders for new d ebt issues and also mus t  
4 2  S ee studies by Kidwe l l , Mar r ,  and Thompson [ 4 2 ] , Marr [ 47 ] , 
Hays , Kidwell  and Marr [ 28 ] , Bhagat and Frost [ 6 ] , and Bhagat , Marr , 
and Thompson [ 7 ] . 
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estimate  d emand for their issues . Potential investors must also deter-
mine a "fair  price" to  offer for the new debt issue . During periods of  
market uncertainty it  is  more d if f icult f or both issuers and investors 
t o  determine a " f air price" becaus e gathering price and demand infor-
mation is more cost ly than during periods when interest rates are more 
stable. 4 3  
Switch hitters may elect to  issue debt privat e ly because changes 
in market uncert ainty affect publ ic and private issue costs  different-
ly. Switch hit t ers do not employ investment bankers in an underwriting 
function when they issue private placements. Investment bankers serve 
only as agents or finders in the private  debt  issue and bear no under-
writing risk in a private sale. Further ,  increased price risk during 
p eriods o f  market uncertainty should affect private issue costs to  a 
lesser extent than it  affect s  publ ic issue costs for two reasons. 
First , the yield to the ult imate investor should not inc lude a premium 
for price risk. In a public  sal e ,  only the underwriter bears this 
risk; the ult imat e  investors are assumed to eliminate price risk b y  
matching the maturity of  their investment with the des ired holding 
period . In a private p lacement , the purchaser of  the is sue negotiates 
for the desir ed maturity which eliminates price r isk . Secon d ,  Garbade 
and S i lber [ 23 ]  show that price risk (what they call liquidity risk) is 
an increasing funct ion of the t ime between market c learing s . In a 
4 3  Th is concept is cons istent with S t igler ' s  model o f  search for 
the best price in a market .  S tudies by Bhagat and Fros t [ 6 ]  and 
Bhagat , Mar r ,  and Thompson [ 7 ] interpret market uncertainty in this 
way. 
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public sale , i t  may take as long as three weeks to sell  an entire issue 
( i . e . , to  c lear the marke t ) . Over such a long period , the underwriter 
may suffer capital losses if the is sue is mispriced due t o  market un­
certainty. On the o ther hand , a private issue is sold instantaneously 
to only one or a small number of investors . Once the price of  the 
issue is set on the commitment dat e ,  the market for that issue i s  
c leared . For the private issue there is no liquidity risk because the 
market for the new issue c lears immediately and further , there is a 
very limited secondary market for private placements so that investors 
must hold the issues unt il maturity.  Thus , market uncertainty should 
have no e f fect on the level of compensation to an investment banker 
acting as an agent for a private p lacement . 
Also , informat ion costs may increase by a smaller amount for pri­
vate issues than for public issues during uncertain marke t s . As s t ated 
earlier , the number o f  potential buyers for a private p l acement is 
lower than the number of potential buyers for a publ ic issu e .  Thus , a 
given expenditure on information may produce a greater search of  the 
private market because fewer buyers must be canvas sed . As a result of  
an  estab lished client relationship , a firm may sell  its  private p l ace­
ments to the same lender over t ime . In this cas e ,  the private borrower 
may canvass only one or two potential lenders . In sum, during periods 
of  market uncertaint y ,  private placemen ts may cost less f or switch 
hitters than comparable public issues because private  placements are 
not affected by inc reased underwriting risk and because informa tion 
costs may be lower for private issues . 
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S t at ement of  Hypotheses 
This chapter has presented theoret ical arguments  for whether pub­
l i c  issue or private placement should be the least expensive method o f  
issuing new d eb t . There are p lausible arguments for either method o f  
s ale result ing in the lowest borrowing cost . O n  one hand t greate r  
search and greater market ability available in the public market sugges t 
that public issues should have lower borrowing cost s .  On the o ther 
hand t the benefits  of direct trans fer of informat ion between borrower 
and lender , lower monitoring and renegotiation costs , and lower f lo ta­
t ion cos t s  suggest that borrowing costs should be lower for private 
placements .  The conflict is  resolved when we estab lish that switch 
hitters and non-switch hitters have different mot ivat ions for using the 
private  p lacement market . Further , switch hit ters may achieve lower 
issue costs  by borrowing privately during periods of market uncer-
tainty . In the final analysis t we conclude that firms choose the 
method of sale that best f i t s  their particu lar c ircumstances ,  and hence 
results in the lowest  borrowing cos t .  
The previous discussion of cost d if ferences between private p lace­
ments and public issues of debt yield the following tes tab l e  hypothe-
ses : 
1 .  For issuers who subs t itute between marke ts ( switch hitters ) , 
p rivat e  p lacement debt sells for the same issue cost  as s imi­
l ar public deb t .  ceteri s paribus .  
4 1  
2 .  For issuers who subst itute between marke t s , the issue cost o f  
private placements  i s  less sensitive t o  changes in marke t  
uncert ainty than comparable  public issues , ceteris paribus .  
3 .  Issuers who do not substitute between marke t s  (non-switch 
hitters) find private placements less cos t ly than public sales 
of  s imilar debt because agency costs are more e asily resolved 
in the private market ,  ceteris paribus . 
4 .  For issuers who do not substitute between marke t s ,  issue cost 
s avings from issuing privately rather than publ icly increase 
as the agency costs of debt increase , ceteris paribus . 
The next chapter reviews the literature of cost  differences b e tween 
publ ic issues and private placement s  and deve lops a mod el to test the 
above hypotheses . 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter ' s f irst section presents the findings of  previou s 
s tudies of  the issue cost d i f fe rence be tween public  and private debt 
markets . The second sect ion develops the empirical model of  issue 
cos t s  which we use to test  the di ssertat ion ' s hypotheses . The final 
section describes the data and presents some preliminary findings . 
Literature Review 
S everal empirical studies have examined the issue cost difference 
b e tween public and private issues of deb t .  Corey [ 1 6 ]  used case 
studies to examine p rivate issues made by four f irms . H is study re-
vealed that firms engage in a cost-benefit ana lysis to det ermine the 
type of f inancing which is least expensiv e .  For exampl e ,  in April 1 94 9  
Cont inental Can Company explicitly considered the flotation cost dif-
ferences between public and private  sales and determined that net o f  
4 4  f lotation cost s ,  private yields were lowe r .  Overall ,  Corey concluded 
that managers choose the least costly method of sale after taking into 
account f irm characterist ics , issue characteristics and market con-
d itions . Unfortunately , the small  sample size of his case study does 
not allow generalization of the result s .  
44 See  C orey [ 1 6 ,  pp.  1 57-228 ] .  
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I n  a later s tudy , Cohan [ 1 4 ]  examined the yield diffe rent ial 
between public and private issues of debt holding certain issue and 
firm characterist ics const attt . Cohan computed a time series o f  average 
yield spreads between private p lacements  and pub l ic is sues for a sample 
of industrial and public utility issues , using multiple  regression to 
account for d if ferences in issue and firm characteristics such as total 
interest obligations , total capitalization , size  of  issu e  and type of  
securit y .  For industrial d ebt , Cohan found that yields o n  private deb t  
exceeded the yields on pub l ic debt by an average o f  1 8  basis points and 
that the private minus public yie ld d if ference varied from -20 basis 
points to  +43 basis point s . For public utility debt the spreads aver-
4 5  aged + 1 6  basis points and varied from + 4  t o  + 2 9  b as i s  points . 
Further ,  Cohan plac ed issues into default  risk classes based on 
t otal cap italizat ion and t imes interest earne d .  Cohan then averaged 
46 the yield spreads for each default risk c lass . For industrials , the 
yield spread decl ined monotonically as d efault risk increased ,  becoming 
negat ive for the two h ighest default r isk categories� For ut ilities , 
this result was not observed ,  and the spreads were positive for all o f  
the risk c lasses . 4 7  
45see  Cohan [ 1 4 ,  pp . 1 29- 13 3 ] . 
4 6s e e  Cohan [ 1 4 ,  p .  130 ] . 
4 7  A s tudy b y  Karna [ 3 8 ]  found s imilar results .  For manufacturing 
and commercial companies he found average private-public spreads 
declining as ratings lowered .  The result was not found for utilitie s ; 
however ,  he performed no statistical tes t s .  
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Cohan ' s study suffers from three data deficiencies . Firs t , he did 
not have a d irect measure of default r:i.sk.  He classified f irms into 
default risk categories based only on total capitalization and t imes 
interest  earne d .  Second , for his samp le of private placements , Cohan 
did not have complete data on important issue characteris t ic s  such as 
the commitment-takedown lag ,  f lo t at ion cost s ,  call provisions , and 
s inking fund requirements .  Finally,  he did not test  fo r the impact o f  
market conditions o n  the f irm' s decision t o  issue debt public ly or  
private ly .  
I n  another study , Wolf [ 66 ]  invest igated the inab ility of some 
indust rial f irms to subst i tute between public and private debt market s .  
H e  recognized that there is a subset of firms who can borrow in both 
markets , and that these  firms should choose the least expensive method  
of  sale . Wolf measured the ab ility of firms to sub st itute by  as suming 
that firms listed in the Fortune 500 could sub s t itute publ ic for pri­
vate debt more easily than other firms . Thus , Wol f  thought that the 
decision of Fortune 500 firms to issue privately should be more sensi­
t ive to the level of the private-public yield spread than the decision 
of other firms . 
Wolf ' s findings supported his assumption. Specifical ly ,  he found 
that as private placements become more expensive than public sales , 
firms reduce their proportion of private borrowing . Wolf then separat­
ed his data series into Fortune 500 and non-Fortune 500 f irms . He 
found that the proport ion of private debt sold by Fortune 500 companies 
was more sensit ive to the private-publ ic yield spread than the propor­
t ion of private debt sold by non-Fortune 5 00 companies . 
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While Wol f ' s  results are intuitively appealing , his study has  
several drawbacks . Firs t ,  Wol f  d id not control the yield spread for 
the effects of  default risk and o ther issue and firm charac terist ics . 
Also ,  he d id not control for f lotation cost differences between the two 
markets and the commitment-takedown lag in the private p l acement mar­
ket .  S econd , his specification of the Fortune 500 dummy in his emp iri­
cal model presumes that only firms in the Fortune 5 00 are able  to sub­
stitute between marke t s . Furthermore , he did not determine which f irm 
and issue characteristics impede a f i rm ' s ability to issue publicly . 
More recently , Zwick [ 68 ]  studied the determinants of private 
yields using aggregate time series  yields from the American Council of 
Life  Insurance (ACLI ) .  He looked at one ACLI risk category which he 
j udged to be  equivalent to Moody ' s  Baa . He  regressed the private yield 
series on the average yield of  B aa corporate deb t ,  a measure of inter­
est rate volatility , a measure of life  insurance company demand for  
private p lacement s ,  and the one-period lagged public yield . Zwick 
found only the public yield and the lagged public yield to be signifi­
cant determinants of private yields . He interprets the nonsignificance 
of the life insurance company demand variable as an indication of  seg­
mentat ion between privat e and public markets  in that life insurance 
companies may not be  able to subs titute between debt markets . Zwick 
also reported that for his sample period , private debt is sues were more 
costly than public is sues by an average of 50 basis points and that the 
spread varied between 5 and 94 basis points . 
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Zwick ' s  results  are not conv:i.ncing on several account s .  F i rst , 
because he uses aggregate dat a ,  he is unable to cons ider is sue or f irm 
charact er istic s  as potent ial determinants of yields . S econd , he may 
not have held defau lt risk cons tant unless we are convinced that 
Moody ' s  and ACLI apply the same criteria in assigning issues to default 
r i sk categories .  Third , h is conc lusion o f  market segmentat ion based on 
the significance o f  the lagged public  yield in his regression equation 
is at odds with the fact that there are both suppliers and demanders o f  
4 8  private debt who are able to sub st itute be tween the two marke t s .  
Finally , Hawkins [ 2 6 ]  also stud ied the y ield d i fferential between 
private p lacement s  and publ ic issues of deb t .  Using a samp le of pri-
vate placements gathered from Investment Dealer ' s  Diges t ,  he confirms 
Cohan ' s  result that the yield spread is posit ive and dec l ines with 
inc reased default risk.  He found an average sp read of +90 basis points 
for high qua lity is sue s ,  but for low qua li ty issues the spread became 
negat ive . Hawkins expected to find a small or z ero private-pub l ic 
spread , ceter is paribu s .  Though interesting , Hawkins '  results should 
b e  viewed with some skepticism. Wh ile he doe s  control for default risk 
and subordination status of the issue,  he performs no statist ical tests 
to determine wh eth er his yield different ials are s i gnif icant ly d i f fer-
ent from zero . Further , he does not adj ust for the commi tment -takedown 
lag or f lotation c os t s .  
4 8  Cabanilla [ 1 1 ]  finds n o  support for market segment at ion a f te r  
examining residual s from the equat ion where private yields are 
regressed on contemporaneous and lagged public yield s . 
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Summary of  the Ev:idence 
These s tudi.es show that an average , private yields exceed public 
yield s . These findings are at  odds with the notion that f irms choose 
the least costly method of sale . If one method consistently dominates 
the othe r ,  then the more cost ly method should disappea r .  Thus , in the 
absence of market imperfect ions , the method of is suing debt should 
result in no is sue cost diffe renc e , ceteris par ibus .  Yet , we observe 
f irms who have a choice issuing privately when on average ,  public 
yields are lowe r .  The studies b y  Cohan and Hawkins also show that any 
yield premium of private  over public issues declines with increased 
d efault risk. However ,  no study sat isfactorily controls for de fault  
risk d i fferences  between issues . 
None of the studies had detailed , mi croeconomic data with which t o  
make ceteris paribus comparisons of issue costs between privat e  and 
public issues . As a result , no study has corre c t ly modeled the differ­
ence between f irms who substitute between public and private d ebt  
issues ( switch hit t ers) and those who do not sub s t itute (non-swit ch 
hitters ) . Further ,  no study examines whether the yield dif ferent ial 
for individual issues varies with market conditions • 
. The Model 
Chapter 3 d eveloped theore tical arguments for whe ther public issue 
or  private  p lacement should be the least expensive method of issuing 
new deb t .  There are arguments .  favoring either method o f  sal e .  On one 
hand,  greater search and marketab ility in the pub lic market suggest 
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that public issues should have lm.;rer issu e  costs . On th e other hand , 
the benef i ts of direct t ran sfer of informat ion be tween borrower and 
lender , lower monitoring and renegot iation costs , and lower flotation 
cos ts sugge st that is sue cos ts should be lower for private placement s .  
The conf lict i s  resolved when we establish that switch hitters and 
non-swit ch hitters have d i f ferent mot ivat ion s for using the pr ivate 
placement marke t .  Further , switch h i tters may achieve lower issue 
costs by borrowing privately during periods of market uncertainty . In 
the final analysis , we conclude th at f i rms choose the least expensive 
method of s ale , given the ir c ircumstance s .  These theoretical argument s 
y ield the following testable hypotheses : 
1 .  For issuers who subst itute between market s  ( switch hitters) , 
private p l acement deb t  sells for the same issu e  cos t as s imi­
lar public deb t , ceteris paribu s . 
2 .  For issuers who subs t i tute be tween markets , the issue cost o f  
private placements is l e s s  sens :l.tive to changes i n  market 
uncertainty than comparab le pub lic issues , ceteris par ibus . 
3 .  Issuers who do not subst itute between marke ts (non-swi tch 
hitters) f ind p r ivate placements less cos t ly than public sales 
of s imilar debt because agency costs are more eas i ly resolved 
in the private market ,  ceteris paribu s . 
4 .  For is suers who do not subst itute between marke t s ,  issue cos t 
savings from issu ing privately increase as the agency cos ts o f  
debt increase , ceteris paribus . 
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To test th ese hypotheses we need t o  develop an emp ir ical model wh ich 
explains the variation of issue cos ts for new issues of bonds by public 
utilities . Fortunat ely , a substantial body of research ex ists on the 
theoretical and emp ir ical determinants of the interest cost paid by 
individual firms on their long-term bond issues . P revious studies [ 2 8 ,  
4 2 ,  56 , 2 1 ,  4 1 ]  suggest that interest cost is a function o f  issue s ize , 
default risk,  the presence of a call provision , the presence o f  a s ink-
ing fund , the prevai ling market rate of interes t ,  credit market con-
ditions , the average sp read of pub lic util ity yields over Treasury 
y ields , and competition f o r  th e is sue . 4
9 
The regres sion model is est imated by ordinary leas t  squares and i s  
formally st ated as 
+ + + + 
YOT = f [ LNS IZE , CALL,  S INK , DRI S K ,  TREAS , VOL , SPREAD ] ( 1 )  
where the sign above each variable shows the expect ed direct ion o f  the 
partial re lat ionship .  The variab les are described below.  
Dependent Variable 
YOT = yield sp read calculated as fo l lows : yield to maturity o f  
4 9  
the issue minus the yield t o  maturity o f  a t reasury issue 
with the same maturity sold on the same day . Daily treasury 
rates were used as reported in Federal Research S t at i stical 
For examp l e , see Sorensen [ 56 ]  , Kidwel l , Mar r , and Thomp son 
[ 4 2 ] , Hays , Kidwell , and Marr [ 2 8 ] , and Mar r  [ 4 7 ] . 
Release , H . l 5 :  
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Selec ted Interest Rates . When a treasury 
rate with a matching maturity was not availabl e ,  the ap pro-
priate t reasury y ield was calculated by interpo lating the 
yields be tween the two trea.sury is sues wi th matur ities 
bounding the issue . The yield to maturity for each issue is 
cal culated account ing for f lo t at ion costs and the commit-
50 ment-takedown lag . 
Independent Variables 
LNS IZE = the natural logarithm of the dollar size of the issue ( in 
thou sands) . 
CALL = years to first call di.virled by th e years t o  maturity . 
S INK = zero-one variab le where SINK = 1 if the is sue has a sink-
ing fund and S INK = 0 if the issue does not have a sink-
ing fund . 
DRISK = a cont inuous and ordinal measure of default risk est imat-
ed from a prob it model us ing a samp le of publicly rated 
bond s .  This measure is developed in detail in Appen-
dix A .  
TREAS = the average daily in terest rate on 1 0  year and longer 
U . S .  treasury bonds on the dote of is sue as  reported in 
Moody ' s Bond Survey . 
50 Kidwel l ,  Mar r ,  and Thompson [ 4 3 )  f irst used YOT as the dependent 
variable in an emp irical model of new i s sue pricing . 
5 1  
VOL = the standard deviation in the long term daily t reasury 
rate (TREAS ) over twenty days prior to the sale date of 
the issue as reported in Moody' s  Bond Survey. 
SPREAD = the dif ference between average interest rates on public 
utility debt and the ave rage long-t erm t reasury rate as 
reported in Moody ' s  Bond Survey. 
Discussion of Variables 
The dependent variab l e  for the model , YOT , is the yield spread off  
a treasury issue with a comparable maturity .  Because borrowers are 
concerned with total issuing costs , the yield to maturity on the issues 
i s  computed as an e ffective yield on net proceeds . This measure is an 
improvement over yield measures used in previous studies since for 
private issues it explici t ly accounts  for the commitment-takedown lag , 
the possibility of multiple takedown dates , and all f lotat ion cost s .  
Daily treasury rat es are used to control for interday changes in inter-
est rat es and term struc ture effects . The YOT mode l  used in this study  
c lose ly resembles the  way in  which f inancial advisers and underwriters 
p rice public and private debt issues . Typically , int ere s t  rates on new 
securitie s ,  public or private ,  are set off of rates on equivalent trea-
5 1  sury securities . 
Size  of the issue may help to explain issue cost because the fixed 
nature of f lotat ion costs  in both underwritten and nonunderwri tten 
5 1  See  Inves tment Dealer ' s  Digest [ 3 1 , p .  7 ] .  Also see Kidwell , 
Marr, and Thompson [ 4 2 ] . 
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issues conveys economies o f  scale . Thus , f o r  larger issue sizes ,  the 
f lotat ion cost per dollar declines as issue size increase s .  To account 
for the pos sibility that economies of scale are exhausted for very 
large is sue sizes the variable is entered in logarithmic form. The 
expected sign is negative . 
A call provision allows the is suer to redeem its bonds at a s t ated  
pric e .  Should market interest rates decline below the bond ' s  current 
y ield,  borrowers can call the bonds and refinance at a lower issu e  
cos t .  A c all provision may also allow a f irm to refinan ce should it s 
f inancial condition s ignif icantly improve . In this c ase , a firm may 
call in a debt issue to rid itself of bond covenants it cons iders 
unduly restric t ive given the change in its c ircumst ances .  The call 
provis ion of fers f lexibility to borrowers , and thus , borrowers are 
willing to pay for its inclusion . On the other hand , the exercise 
of  the call by a borrower may be detrimental to the lender for two 
reasons . F irst , if the issue is called when market interest rates are 
declining , investors suffer an opportunity loss because they can 
reinvest only at a lower intere s t  rat e .  S e cond , inves tors incur addi­
t ional transact ions costs to  reinvest their funds . Thus , investors 
require a premium to compensate them for the expected loss which 
results f rom the inclusion of the call featur e .  CALL measures the 
d egree of call protect ion. The longer the call deferment period rela­
t ive to the f inal maturity ,  the greater the call protect ion.  There­
fore , the call variable  should enter the equation with a nega t ive sign .  
5 3  
A s inking fund provision requires borrowers to retire a certain 
amount of debt over the life of the bond issu e .  The issuer may ret ire 
the debt either by purchasing it in the secondary market or by redeem-
ing it for a specified price from individual investor s . S inking funds 
can benefit investors in two ways . First , b ecaus e b orrowers mus t  
periodically purchase a certain amount of  out standing deb t , an act ive 
secondary market is created for the issue . This increases an issue ' s  
marketability and results in a lower borrowing cost for the issue r . 
Second , the sinking fund provides informat ion about the probability of 
default since uncertainty about a f irm ' s ability to p ay is  resolved as 
payments to the sinking fund are mad e . Thus , a sinking fund is  expect-
ed to lower borrowing costs  of new is sues and the sinking fund variable 
52  should obtain a negative s ign. 
Default risk is the probability that a borrower will  fail to  make 
a p romised payment as stipulat ed in the bond contrac t .  Investors form 
subj ective beliefs about the probab il ity of default for a bond issue.  
As  that probab i l ity increases ,  investors requ ire greater yields as  
compensat ion for  expected losses and for risk bearing.  Inves tors have 
found the quality ratings assigned either by S t andard and Poor ' s  or  
Moody ' s  to  be good indicators of  the probability of default .  Past 
studies have measured default risk by including a series of dummy vari-
ables representing the diffe rent rat ing categories . 
5 2s iNK is also inc luded in the bond rat ing model explained in 
Appendix A. However ,  SINK is included in the YOT model because it is 
expect ed to reflect other aspects of its effect on YOT . 
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For private placements ,  however , publicly available rat ings are 
not used ; thus , this method of measuring default risk is not pos sible  
for these  is sues , One solu tion to this problem is to assign ratings t o  
private placements with a bond rating model e s t imated f o r  a sample o f  
rated , publicly sold public ut ility bonds . This approach i s  not prac­
t ic al because new public issues by public utili t ies  typical ly do  not 
receive rat ings below investment grade . This means that it  would not 
be possib le to use a straightfo rward c l assif icat ion model to ordinal ly 
rank private placements on default risk because s ome private issuers 
would receive ratings below inves tment grade were they to issue pub­
licly . Hence , ratings assigned t o  private placements  in this fashion 
would be upwardly biased . 
To eliminate this problem, we use the probit methodology on our 
sample of  public issues to estimate the unobserved default risk index 
for each public and private issue . First , for the public sample  we 
estimate a probit bond rat ing model which contains a s t andard set o f  
issue characteristics , issuer characteristics and market conditions . 
This procedure gives us e s t imates for the unobservable default risk 
index and also tells us how to classify issues into rating categories 
based on the e s t imat ed index. Then , we substitute is sue characteris­
t ic s ,  is suer characteristics and market conditions for the sampl e  o f  
private p lacements  into the probit mode l  to obt ain e s t imates of  the 
default risk index for these issues . This default risk index {DRI SK) 
is  a continuous ,  ordinal measure of d efault risk which obt ains values 
anywhere on the real line . Thus , below investment grade issues will 
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have high values f o r  DRISK. Further , w e  determine which issues are 
below inves tment grade by est imating the first order stat ist ic of DRISK 
for the sample of  publ ic issues . Issues with a value for DRISK greater 
than the f irst order statis t ic are assumed to be  below investment 
grade . Readers desiring a de tailed descript ion of our method of  
measuring default risk for  private placement s should see  Appendix A .  
The daily long-term Treasury rate (TREAS ) is  included i n  the model 
to control for any effect that changes in the level of interest rates 
have upon YOT . TREAS should obt ain a positive sign .  The pricing o f  
new debt issues is also influenced b y  credit market conditions a t  the 
time of sale . C redit market uncertainty is measured by the standard 
deviat ion (VOL) of the long-term treasury rate (TREAS) twenty t rading 
days (one trad ing month) preceding the issue ' s sale dat e .  Note that 
VOL is a measure of market uncertainty and not of the underwriting risk 
involved with the sale of an individual issue . I ssue cost is also 
influenced by the business cycle . We include the average spread be-
tween pub l ic utility issues and long-term Treasury issues (S PREAD ) on 
the sale date in the model to control for the systemat ic variation in 
53 YOT due to changes in the bus iness cycle . 
5 3van Horne [ 6 1 ]  argues that investors ' ut ility may be stat e  
d ependent . They seem to prefer higher quality issues during recessions 
and lower quality issues during expansions , and they shift  the ir hold­
ings accordingly . Supply and demand pressures result ing from this 
b ehavior cause risk premiums to vary contracyclical l y .  Jaffee [ 32 ] and 
Benson , Kidwell ,  Ko ch , and Rogowski ( 5 ] present empirical evidenc e 
supporting this hypothesis .  SPREAD is also inc luded in the bond rating 
model for reasons explained in Appendix A .  However ,  SPREAD is inc luded 
in the YOT model because it is expected to ref lect o ther aspects of its 
effect on YOT . 
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The Data 
The data consist of 293 pub l ic utility debt issues sold publ icly 
and privately from June 1 9 7 9  to December 1 9 8 3 . 54  The 57 privat e 
placements were ident ified using Ebasco ' s Analysis of Public Utility 
Financing; however,  because complete public information is not avail-
able for private placement s ,  it was neces sary to survey each issuer to 
obtain detailed informat ion about each is sue such as commitment date s , 
takedown dates ,  call provisions ,  sinking funds , f lotation cos ts and 
coupon rates . Eighty percent of  the f i rms surveyed resp onded to the 
questionnaire . A sample questionnaire ls included as Appendix B .  The 
collection of detailed informat ion on individual private issues is 
important because past studies have been unable to adju s t  private 
y ields for flotation costs , the commitment-takedown lag and the fact 
that some issues have multiple takedown dates . 
5 4  Issues b y  telephone companies are excluded from the sample s ince 
they are not energy-related , and s ince they are regu!ated different ly . 
Evidence by Hays , Kidwell ,  and Marr [ 2 8 ]  indicates that telephone com­
p any debt issues are priced differently than debt issued by other 
utilities . Thus the sample consis ts of electric companies ,  gas com­
panies , and gas/e lectric comb inat ions . Issues by Public S ervice of New 
Hampshire were excluded to increase the homogeneity of the sample . 
PSNH experienced severe financ ial difficulty associated with i t s  
nuc lear involvement .  See Business Week , Oct . 1 ,  1 984 , "Failure at 
Seabrook Could S et Off Chain Reaction . " PSNH had its issues downgraded 
by Moody ' s as a result of its problems . See Moody' s Bond Survey, 
April 2 3 , 1 984 , Ap ril 30 , 1 984 , and September 1 7 ,  1 984 . New issues by 
PSNH were the only ones in the sample to  obtain ratings below Baa . 
Several private is sues were committed du ring the last 6 months of 1 9 7 9 , 
but were taken down in 1 98 0 . The i s sues were pri ced on the commitment 
d ate . Thus , the public s ample was ext ended back to June 1 9 7 9  so that 
it would contain controls for these private issue s .  
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Informat ion about the 2 36 public is sues was gathered from Ebasco ' s 
Analys is of Publ ic Utility Financing and Drexe l ,  Burnham, and Lambert ' s 
Publ ic  Offerings of Corporat e Securities . Issues with conversion fea-
tures or variable coup on rates are excluded to create a more homogenous 
sample that better allows for interissue cost comparisons . Next , we 
examine the descrip t ive statistics for the sample and discuss some 
p reliminary f indings . 
Pub l ic and Private Y ie lds 
The empirical evidence reviewed earlier suggests that private 
yields generally exceed public yield s .  Pre l iminary ana lys is of  the 
data shows the contrary. Figure 1 shows the ave rage monthly yield on 
55  net proceeds for public and p r ivate issues during the test period . 
Throughout most of  the test period , public yields exceeded private 
y ields . Only during three periods did private yields exceed public  
yields as we expected--May 1 980-July 1 980 , February 1 982-December 1 98 2 , 
and July 1 9 83-September 1 98 3 .  Thus , issue cost savings appear to  be 
the motivation for public utilities to issue debt by private placement . 
This f inding is contrary to previous empirical findings for three 
possib le reasons . First , yield on net proceeds accounts for all flota-
tion costs . For public issues , these costs include out-of-pocket 
expenses and underwriter ' s spread . For private issue s , there are only 
5 5  Yield o n  net proceeds i s  the yield to maturity adj usted for 
f lotation costs .  Flotat ion costs are subtracted from the face amount 
to obtain net p ro ceeds . Flotat ion costs include the underwriter ' s 
spread and out-of-pocket expense s  for public is sues and agent ' s fees 
and out-of-pocket expenses for private issues . 
Ill 
1J Gl Gl u 
0 I.. 
n. 
..... Gl 
z 
c 
0 
1J 
., 
5= 
1 9  
1 8  
1 7  
1 6  
1 5  
1 4  
1 3  
1 2  
1 1  
1 980 
CJ Private Yields 
1 9 8 1  
Public a n d  Private Sales by Utilities 
- - --- -------- -- -- -----
!\ 
�  
�v� I 
I 
I 
1 982 
Till I I I I I  I I I I I I I I 
1 983 
January 1 980 to December 1 9 83 
+ Public Yields 
Figure 1. New I s sue Borrowing Costs  
VI 
CX) 
59 
out-of-pocket expenses . Thus flotation costs are like ly to be much 
higher for public issues than private issue s ,  and this d if f erence may 
result in a higher yield on net proceed s for public issues . 
S econd , we have not controlled the is sue cost difference for the 
e f fects of marke t conditions . D i s cussion in Chapter 3 sugge sts that 
pub l ic is sues may be more expens ive than private issues during periods 
of volatile inte rest rates . The late 1 9 7 0s and early 1 98 0s were peri­
ods of unp recedented uncer tainty about interest rate movements .  Thus , 
public issues are likely to be mo re expensive during th is period . 
Finally , we have not held default risk constant and it is possible 
that there are more investment grade p riva te issues than previously 
thought . For below investment grade issuer s , the stri.c ter covenants on 
private pl acement s may result in lower actual de faul t r isk and lowe r 
b orrowing cost s .  In sum, we canno t make meaningful comparisons o f  
issue cost s  without ho ld ing f lo tat ion cost s ,  market conditions , and 
default r isk const ant . 
Figure 2 shows the dif ference between public and p rivate yields 
over the test period . What is interesting is that the interest cos t 
savings from issuing privately are quite large--at one point they ex­
ceed 300 bas is points (March 1 980) .  Wh ile unadj usted for in ter issue 
differences such as default risk or market conditions , the magnitude o f  
the dif ferences suggests interest cost s avings as a pos sib le economic 
rat ionale for the ex istence of the private placement marke t .  
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Ident ificat ion of Switch Hitters 
and Non-Switch Hitters 
6 1  
Before we can meaningfully discuss the characteristics  of  the 
sample , we must operat ionalize the division between private issuers who 
subs t itute between public issues and private placements ( switch 
hitters) and those who do not (non-switch hitters) . We identified 
switch hitters and non-switch hitters based upon three factors . First , 
we considered the length of t ime s ince the issuer had issued in the 
public market because issuers who have been out of the public market 
f or long periods of  t ime may f ind in consistently less expensive to 
issue privately. We measured this length of  time as the number  of  
years since the  last public sal e .  Second , we considered the f irm' s 
default risk because Cohan [ 1 4 ]  and Shapiro and Wolf { 5 3 ]  suggest that 
firms with high default  risk may be confined to the private marke t .  We 
measured default risk us ing our default risk index (DRISK) . Finally, 
because Cohan and Shapiro and Wolf sugge st that smaller f irms tend to  
be confined to the private placement market , we used total assets to  
distinguish between switch hitters and non-switch hitters . 
We identified switch hi tters and non-switch h it ters applying the 
f o llowing three cri teria. Firs t ,  all private issuers who issued pub-
licly during the sample period were c lassified as switch hitters . 
Second , all below investment grade private issuers who h ad not issued 
pub licly in over five years were c lassified as non-switch hitters . 
Finally , of  the remaining f i rms , those with total assets less than one 
b illion dol lars and who had not issued publicly in over five years were 
c lassified as non-switch hitters . Appendix C gives a listing of years 
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s ince the last publ ic sal e ,  the default risk index , and total assets 
for each private issue r .  Furthe r ,  the appendix ident ifies switch 
h itters and non-switch hitters . 
Mean Characteristics of  the Sample 
We examine the mean characteris t ic s  of  the sample shown in Table 3 
to  gain further insight into the differenc es between private p lacement s 
and public  issues . The f indings confirm some of  the st atements about 
private placements made in Chapters 2 and 3 .  Table 3 shows that YOT 
for public issues exceeds that for private issues by 5 2  basis point s on 
average . S imilarly , issue cost for public issues exceeds that for 
p rivate issues by 65 basis points on average , These results are at 
odds with the widely held belief that private yields exceed public 
yields on average . 
Before comparing f lotation costs between private placements and 
public issues we should note that f lotation costs consist of two compo­
nents . One part of f lotat ion cost is the underwriter ' s spread . This 
spread is the underwriter ' s compensation for originat ion serv ices and 
risk bearing in a pub l ic sale of deb t .  Private placements are not 
underwritten ; thus , there is no underwriter ' s spread f or these issues . 
The other component of  f lotat ion costs is  out-of-pocket expense s .  
These expenses include such items a s  legal fees and accountant ' s fee s . 
For public sales , out-of-pocket expenses also include the cost of SEC 
registration. Private placements do not incur the cost of  S EC regis­
t ration. However,  fo r private pl acements ,  out-of-pocket expenses 
include a finder ' s fee paid to the f irm' s financial adviser . 
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TABLE 3 
MEAN CR�CTERISTICS FOR SAMPLE OF PUBLIC 
UTILITY BONDS 
Characteris t ic 
Number 
Y ield off  Treasury (%) 
Issue Cost (%) 
Flotation Costs ($ per $ 1 000) : 
Underwriter ' s Sp read 
Out-of-Pocket Expenses 
Total 
Issue S i z e  
(milions of $)  
Total Assets 
(billions of $ )  
Default Risk Index 
Years S ince Last 
Public I ssue 
Maturity (years) 
Years to First Call 
S inking Fund I ssues (%)  
Private Is sues 
Public Switch Non-Switch 
I s sues Total Hitters 
2 36 5 7  39  
2 . 34 1 . 82 1 . 8 1  
1 4 . 56 1 3 . 9 1  1 3 . 80 
8 . 06 
3 . 5 9  
1 1 . 6 2 
80 . 1 9 
3 . 36 
1 . 36  
* 
1 9 . 56 
5 . 4 3  
1 8 . 20 
0 . 00 
7 . 86 
7 . 86 
39 . 6 5 
2 . 26 
7 . 04 
1 1 . 4 2  
1 2 . 47 
5 . 64  
7 0 . 20 
o . oo 
7 . 9 6  
7 . 9 6  
47 . 85 
3 . 04 
1 . 3 1 
1 . 9 2  
1 2 . 35 
5 . 42  
66 . 7 0  
Hitters 
1 8  
1 . 82 
1 4 . 1 6 
o . oo 
4 . 98 
4 . 98 
2 1 . 90 
0 . 56 
1 9 . 47 
1 5 . 39 
1 2 . 7 2  
6 . 1 0 
7 7 . 7 0 
*Th is characteris t ic is not applicable to current publ ic is suers . 
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Table 3 presents the average flotation costs for public and pri­
vate issuers . As expecte d ,  f lotation costs are much lower for private 
placements than f o r  public issue s .  Total flotation costs for private 
placements average  $7 . 86 per $ 1 000 compared with $1 1 . 62 per $ 1 000 for 
public issues . C learly , the underwriter • s spread for public issues o f  
$8 . 06 per $ 1 000 cause s  f lotation costs t o  be greater  for publ ic issue s . 
Out-of-pocket expenses for public  issues are lower on average than 
those for private issues , but this result is reasonab le because some o f  
the services o f  a f inancial adviser which a private i s suer pays for 
explicitl..I. would be paid by the publ ic issuer implicitly through the 
underwriter ' s spread . Thus , it may not be correct to compare out-of­
pocket  expenses of public and private issues . 
One point of conventional thought about private placements veri­
f ied by the s ample is that the average issue size of private placements 
i s  considerably smaller than that o f  public issues . Specifically , 
Table 3 shows that the average public issue is twice the size  of  the 
average private p l acement ( $ 80 million versus $ 40 million) . Further , 
notice that swit ch hitters sell much larger issues than non-switch 
h it ters ($48  mil lion versus $22  million) . 
There are several reasons that private p lacements are smaller than 
public sales . Firs t , firms issuing privately tend to be smaller than 
firms issuing pub l icly.  Not ice that private is suers have average total 
assets of $ 2 . 26 billion compared with $3 . 36 billion for public  issuers ; 
however ,  public is sues and p rivate issues by switch hitters tend to  be  
made by  firms of similar size ($3 . 36 billion versus $ 3 . 04 billion) . As  
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expected , non-switch hitters tend to be much smaller;  the average non­
switch h itter has total assets of only $ 0 . 6 billion. S econd , it may be 
that switch hit ters of good credit quality issue privately when the 
size  of issue is small because of the diff iculty of selling small 
issues publicly . Finally , investment grade non-switch hitters may sell 
private ly because their small issues would have limited marketability 
in public marke ts .  
The average values o f  the default risk  index (DRISK) show that 
private p lacements have much higher default risk than publ ic issue s .  
The average value o f  DRI SK for private placement s is 7 . 04 and only 1 . 36 
for publ ic issue s .  Two other observations are worth not in g .  Firs t , 
the average de fault risk index for the switch hit ters is nearly identi­
c al to that for pub l ic issuers . We expect this result because swi tch 
hitter s  have free access to both markets . Second , non-switch hitters 
exhib it much higher levels of default risk than switch hitters and 
public issuers . This result is expected because h i gh default risk of  
non-switch hitters means that their issues would have l imited market­
ability in public markets . 
To gain further insight into the default risk differences between 
pub l ic issues and private placements we examine the distribut ion of  
issues among bond rating categories in  Table 4 .  To rate private place­
ments , we p laced their characteristics into the probit bond rat ing 
model and ob tained estimated bond rat ings . Because the probi t  model 
does not predict below investment grade rating s ,  the cutoff f or invest­
ment grade was determined by f inding the f i rst order statistic for 
Moody ' s 
A a 
A 
Baa 
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TABLE 4 
COMPARISON OF BOND RATINGS BETWEEN PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE ISSUES OF DEBT 
Private I s sues 
Pub l ic Switch 
Bond Rat ing I s sues Total Hitters 
1 9 . 5% 1 5 . 8% 1 5 . 4% 
50 . 0  4 2 . 1  5 6 . 4  
30 . 5  24 . 6  28 . 2  
Below Inves tment 
Grade 0 . 0  1 7 . 5  o . o  
100 . 0% 1 00 . 0% 1 00 . 0% 
Non-Switch 
Hitters 
1 6 . 7% 
1 1 . 1  
1 6 . 7  
55 . 5  
100 . 0 %  
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the default risk index (DRISK) . Bonds with values of  DRISK greater 
than the f ir s t  order statist ic were placed in the below inves tment 
grade category . Table 4 confirms that private issues tend to have 
higher default risk than public issues . Firs t ,  note that the public 
s ample has a greater percentage o f  is sues in each of  the investment 
grade categories than the private sample . Further ,  notice that there 
are no issues below investment grade in the public sample while 
1 7 . 5  percent of the private samp le wou ld be considered below investment 
grade in the public markets . Next , we f ind a lower percentage o f  
inves tment grade issues among non-switch hitters than among switch 
hitters . Additionally , we find that over half of the non-switch 
hitters ( 5 5 . 5  percent)  are below investment grade whi le there are no 
switch hitters in this category . Finally , notice that switch hitters 
and pub l ic issuers have a near ly ident ical distribution among bond 
rating categories . 
This analysis of  issue size , total assets and default risk sup­
por ts the conventional wisdom that non-switch hitters tend to be small­
er , riskier firms who i ssue small amounts of deb t .  The distinct ion 
between switch hitters and non-switch hit ters is c lear when we notice 
that non-switch hitters have been out of  the public market 1 5  years on 
average as compared with 2 years for swit ch hitters ( See Table 3) . 
Table 3 shows that issue  characteristics d i f fer between private 
placements and publ ic issues . Firs t ,  private p lacements have shorter 
maturit ies than public issues on average ( 1 2  years versus 20 years) . 
This resul t  confirms market lore that purchasers of private p lacements 
6 8  
prefer intermediate-t erm issues . 5 6  Lenders may perceive that they can 
mitigate the agency problems of private issuers by shortening the matu­
r ity of the borrower ' s deb t . 5 7  S econd , call protect ion as measured by 
years to f irst call appears to be s imilar for pub l ic and private 
issues ; however , when we consider years to first call relative to the 
term to maturity we see that call  protect ion is much great er for pri­
vate issues (0 . 48 versus 0 . 2 7 ) . Finally , there is a much greater 
percent age of  is sues with sinking funds in the private market than in 
the public  market (70 . 2  percent versus 1 8 . 2  percent ) . This result is 
consistent with the idea that shortening the debt ' s maturity will 
reduce agency problems . The s inking fund is  one means of shortening 
the debt ' s effective maturity . Further , the sinking fund may reduce 
the default risk of private borrowers becaus e uncertainty about a 
f irm ' s abi lity to pay is resolved as sinking fund payments are made . 
Also not ice that the percentage of sinking fund issues i s  greater for 
non-switch hitters than for switch h itters ( 7 7 . 7  percent versus 
6 6 . 7  percent ) .  This result shows that non-sw:f.tch hitters may exhibit 
greater agency problems than switch hitters . 
Summary 
Past empirical studies show than on average ,  private yields exceed 
public y ields . This result is  no t surprising given the fundament al 
56 See Kidde r ,  Peabody , and Co . [ 40 ] . 
5 7  See Myer s  [ 4 8 ] . 
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differences between public is sues and private issues . However ,  holding 
all o ther factors constant , method of sale should not inf luence issue 
cost and so there should be no issue cost differential between private 
p lacements and public issue s .  Past studies found such differenti als as 
s tatistical artifacts of  de fault risk differences ,  flo tat ion cost dif­
ference s ,  and other differences in issue and issuer characteristics 
g iven that detailed information on individual private issues was not 
available . 
This chapter develops an empirical model of  new issue  borrowing 
costs to test the dissertation ' s hypothese s .  Issue cost f o r  new issues 
of  debt is influenced by issue size , default risk , call provisions , 
s inking fund provisions and market conditions . A distinguishing char­
acteristic of this dissertat ion is  that we have colle cted sufficient 
informat ion to make ceteris paribus comparisons of issue cost between 
individual is sues of publicly sold and privately placed debt . In par­
t icular , we account for default risk, f lotat ion cost s ,  the commit­
ment-takedown lag , the non-switch hitter phenomenon and is sue charac­
terist ics . 
The chapter also present s some preliminary findings . First , issue 
costs are greater for public issues than for private p lacements over 
the sampl e  period . While these cost differences were subs tant ial dur­
ing some periods , the differences were not adj usted for important issue 
charact erist ics , issuer characteristic s  and market conditions at the 
t ime of sal e .  Second , an examination of the sample ' s characteristics 
reveals substantial differences between public  is sues and private 
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p lacement s  and indicates the  need to control for these characteristics 
before making is sue cost comparisons . The next chapter develpps empir­
ical tests for each of  the dissertat ion ' s hypotheses and discusses the 
f indings . 
7 1  
CHAPTER 5 
THE FINDINGS 
This chapter tests the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 .  The 
firs t  sect ion presents the f indings on whether private placement s  or 
public issues are more expensive f or switch hitters , ceteris paribus . 
The second sect ion presents the find ings on how agency cos ts of debt 
affect is sue costs of non-switch hit ter s . The f inal section summarizes 
the empirical results . 
The Cost Relationship Between Private Placement s 
by Switch Hitters and Public I s sues 
This sect ion tests the two hypotheses of  issue cost differences 
between private placements by switch hitters and public  issue s . The 
d issertat ion ' s first two hypotheses are restated below :  
1 .  For issuers who substitute between markets ( switch hitters) , 
private p lacement debt sells for the same issue cos t  as simi-
lar publ ic deb t ,  ceteris paribus . 
2 .  For issuers who sub s t itute between market s ,  the issue cost of 
private placements is less sensit ive to  changes in market 
uncertainty than comparable public  issues , ceteris paribus . 
To test these hypotheses we use the empirical model of issue cos t 
developed in Chapter 4 (Eq . 1 ) . The sample consists of 2 7 5  new bond 
issues sold by pub l ic utilities during 1 97 9- 1 98 3 : 236  issues are 
7 2  
5 8  negotiated public sales and 39  are private placements by swi tch 
hitters . 
Private P lacements versus Public Sales 
To test whether issue costs differ between private placements by 
switch hitters and publ ic sales ( the f irst hypothesis stated above) ,  we 
include the dichotomous variable PRIV in Eq . 1 and then e s t imate the 
model with ordinary least squares regression . PRIV equals one for 
private issues by switch hitters , and zero for public issues and its 
coefficient is an estimate of the average issue cost difference between 
a public sale and a private placement , ceteris paribu s . Previous dis-
cussion suggests that any consistent cost advantage of  one method o f  
sale over the other would result in the disappearance of  the more cost-
ly method ;  thus , we should be unab le to  rej ect the null  hypothes is that 
the coef ficient of PRIV is different from zero . This result is consis-
tent with the idea that switch hitters view private p lacements as c lose 
substitutes for public sales . 
Table 5 presents the results  of the empirical tests . Equation 5 . 1  
is the e stimate of the control model except that our defau lt risk index 
(DRISK) is omitted . This allows us to focus on the impact of DRISK on 
the model ' s explanato ry powe r .  Turning to Equation 5 . 1 ,  we not ice that 
the expl anato ry power of the model is low: 2 the adj usted R is  only 
0. 326 . However ,  all coefficients have the predicted s ign and are 
5 8  Negot iated is sues are used t o  hold the effects of  competit ion 
for the issues constant . This assumes that a negot iated is sue and a 
private p lacement effectively receive one b id for the is sue . 
TABLE 5 
YIELD OFF TREASURY REGRESSION ESTIMATES FOR SAMPLE OF PUBLICLY 
AND PRIVATELY I SSUED PUBLIC UTILITY DEBT 
Equa tion ( 5 . 1) Equat ion ( 5 . 2 ) Equat ion ( 5 . 3) Equation (5 . 4) 
Explanatory 
Variable Coeffic ient t value Coe f ficient t value Coef ficient t value Coeffic ient t value 
Controls 
CONSTANT -0. 977 - 2 . 40 -0. 8 66 - 2 .48 -0. 815 - 2 . 31 -0 . 89 2  - 2 . 54 
CALL -0 . 961 -4 . 8 5  -1 . 03 6  -6.10 -1.021 -5 . 9 9  -1.037 -6 . 15 
S INK -0. 398 -3 . 73 - 0 . 4 17 -4 . 5 6  -0. 377 - 3 . 8 0  -0. 375 - 3 . 8 3  
TREAS 0 . 16 7  4 . 5 2  0 . 14 5  4 . 5 7  0 . 144 4 . 5 2  0 . 14 7  4 . 66 
VOL 1 .  799 4 . 3 9  1 . 6 77 4 . 7 7  1 . 665 4 . 74 1 . 979 5 . 37 
SPREAD 0 . 58 0  5 .  71 0 .48 2 5 . 50 0 .471 5 . 34 0 .463 5 .30 
DRISK . . 0 . 3 22 9 . 9 1  0 . 322 9 . 88 0 . 317 9 . 96 ....,. 
Hypothe ses w 
PRIV . . . . -0. 131 -1.07  0 . 3 91 1 . 66 
PRIV*VOL . 
. . 
. . . - 2 . 30 2  - 2 . 6 0  
Adj usted R2 0 . 326 0 . 50 5  0 . 518 0 , 516 
F statistic 2 7 . 5 39 4 7 . 6 37 41. 015 37 . 503 
Std. Error o. 754 0 . 646 0 . 64 6  0 . 639 
Dep . Mean 2 . 266 2 . 266 2 . 2 66 2 . 266 
Sample S ize 275 275 2 7 5  275 
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statis t ically dif ferent from zero at a one percent s ignificance leve l .  
The signs and magnitudes o f  the coefficients o f  Equat ion 5 . 1  are s imi-
lar to those of is sue cost models  in previous stud ies [ 28 ,  4 2 ,  56 , 2 1 , 
4 1 ] . 5 9  CALL holds the effect of  the call provis ion cons tant . The 
coefficient o f  CALL obt ains the negative sign as pred icted . The co-
efficient on CALL suggests that a one percentage po int increase in the 
call deferment period as a percent age of f inal maturity results in an 
60 issue cost s avings of  approximately one basis point . S INK is a 
zero-one variable measuring the presence of a sinking fund p rovision. 
The coefficient of  S INK obtains the predicted negative sign and tells 
us that an issue wh ich employs a s inking fund will  save 40 bas is points 
on average over an issue without a sinking fund , ceteris paribus . The 
YOT scaling variable , TREAS , obtains the pred icted positive s ign . The 
coef f icient suggests that an increase of  one percentage point ( 100 
basis points )  in the current long-term Treasury rate corresponds to  an 
increase in YOT o f  1 6 . 7  bas is point s . The measure of market uncer-
tainty , VOL , also has the predicted s ign and suggests that a one per-
centage point increase in the volatility of market interest rates (AVOL 
= 0 . 0 1 )  resul ts in an increase in YOT of approximate ly 1 . 8 basis 
5 9Is sue size is excluded from the model .  The variab le was t ried 
in different funct ional forms and did not ob tain a significant coeff i­
c�ent or the correct sign.  Explanato ry power of the mode l  (adj usted 
R ) increas ed when the model was removed from the equat ion.  None of 
the results  in th is dissertat ion was af fected by leav ing out issue 
s iz e .  
60 oYOT/oCALL = -0 . 96 1  which is approximately -1 basis point . 
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6 1  points . The cyc lical vari able , SPREAD , has the expected positive 
s ign and its coeff icient suggests that a 1 00 basis point increase in 
SPREAD corresponds to an increase in YOT of 58 basis points . This 
f inding for SPREAD is evidence that YOT behaves as a risk premium over 
the business cycle--widening during recessions and narrowing durin g  
expansions . 
Equat ion 5 . 2  includes all the regres sors in Equation 5 . 1  plus our 
default risk index , DRISK . The default risk index has the predicted 
posit ive sign and reduces the unexplained variance ( 1  - adj usted R2 ) by 
62 27  percent . The estimated coefficient suggests  that an increase o f  
one unit on the default risk index increases YOT b y  approximately 32 
basis point s .  The high t value for DRISK (t = 9 . 9 1 )  and the large 
reduct ion in unexplained variance of YOT reinforces the importance of  
default risk as  the maj or determinant of issue cost  and is  evidence of  
the e f fect iveness of  our measure in controlling for interissue varia-
t ion in default r isk . 
To test the first hypothesis we add the zero-one variable PRIV to 
the model in Equation 5 . 3 .  As predicted , the e s t imated coeff icient of 
PRIV is not s ignificantly different from zero ; thus , over  the test 
6 1  Suppose t\VOL = 0 . 0 1 ,  then t\YOT = 0 . 0 1  x 1 7 9 basis points o r  
approximately 1 . 8  bas is points .  
6 2 [ adj . R2 ( Eq .  5 . 2) -adj . R2 ( Eq .  5 . 1 ) ] / [ 1-adj . R2 ( Eq .  5 . 2 ) ] = ( 0 . 505-
0 . 326 ) / ( 1 -0 . 326 )  = 0 . 2 66 ,  or approximately 27  percent . Also note that 
DRISK can be cons idered an instrumental variable , given its  est imat ion 
b ased on some o f  the variables in the model . The t values are adj ust ed 
with a technique sugge sted by Godfrey [ 2 4 ] which gives unbiased 
t values for  instrumental variables . The unadj usted t values for DRISK 
were 1 0 . 07 , 9 . 9 1 ,  and 9 . 85 for Equations 5 . 2 ,  5 . 3 ,  and 5 . 4 ,  respec­
t ively . 
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period there appears t o  b e  no issue cost diffe rence o n  average between 
private placements by switch hitters and publ ic s ales . This finding is 
c ons istent with the absence of market segmentat ion between public and 
private markets because f irms selling their debt in the least costly 
market would e liminate any cons istent cost difference . In the ext reme , 
all switch hitters would issue debt in the market with the lowest cos t , 
and the other market would cease to exist . However ,  because we know 
that both markets exist , there must be conditions under which one meth­
od of s ale is less expensive than the other . In particular , Figure 2 
( see Chapter 4 ,  p .  60)  shows substantial cost differences which vary 
over t ime . D iscussion in Chapter 3 suggests that the cost dif ference 
between publ ic is sues and private placements varies with the degree o f  
market uncertainty . I n  the next sect ion , we test f o r  the ef fects o f  
market uncertainty o n  issue cost s . 
Market Uncertainty Tests 
To test whether the issue cost of private placements by switch 
hitters is less sensitive to changes in market uncertainty than public 
issues ( the second hypothesis stated above) we add the interact ive 
variable PRIV * VOL to the model in Equat ion 5 . 4 .  The est imated co­
e f f icient of PRIV * VOL measures the relat ionship between YOT and VOL 
for switch hitters ( i . e . , oYOT /oVOL when PRIV = 1 ) . The coefficient o f  
PRIV * VOL i s  significant ly different from zero and has the expected 
negative s ign . This finding suggests  that private is sue costs are le ss 
sensitive to changes in market uncertainty than publ ic issue costs . 
For the mean value of VOL for the sample (VOL = 0 . 23) , the coefficient 
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of  PRIV * VOL suggests  that switch hi tters can save 1 3 . 8  basis point s 
by is suing privately;  as expected ,  this e s t imated s aving is nearly 
identical to that suggested by the es timate of PRIV in Equat ion 5 .  3 
( - 13 .  8 bas is points versus -1 3 . 1  po ints )  which was not significantly 
d if ferent from z ero . 6 3  
As market s  become unstable , a cost advantage of  private placements 
over public issues is apparent . For the maximum value of VOL (VOL = 
0 .  796 ) , Equat ion 5 . 4  suggests that switch hitters may save as much as 
64 1 44 basis points by is suing privately rather than pub l ic ly .  Such a 
large cost differential is consistent with the observed public-private 
cost differences seen in Table 3 (p . 6 3 )  and Figure 2 (p . 60) . Fur-
ther ,  the idea that there may be rather large cost differentials favor-
ing private placements is inconsistent with Wall S t reet lore and previ-
ous emp irical studie s . However ,  because 1 979-1 983  was characterized by 
unprecedented interest rate vo latil ity,  the results  may be specific to 
our test period . During more stab le period s ,  the results suggest the 
cost different ial may become smaller or actually reverse . Specifical-
ly , for the minimum value of VOL (VOL = 0 . 05) , Equation 5 . 4  indicates 
that private p lacements may have cost 28 basis points more than public  
65 issues , on average . This result supports the pos s ible cost reversal 
mentioned above . 
6 3oYOT /o PRIV = 0 . 39 1  - 2 . 302*VOL = 0 . 39 1  - 2 . 302 ( 0 . 23 )  = 0 , 1 38 or  
- 1 3 . 8  basis point s .  
64oYOT/ oPRIV = 0 . 39 1  - 2 . 302*VOL = 0 . 39 1 - 2 . 302 (0 . 7 96 )  = -1 . 44 or 
- 1 44 bas is points . 
65oYOT/oPRIV = 0 . 39 1  - 2 . 302*VOL = 0 . 39 1  - 2 . 302 (0 . 05 )  = 0 . 2 7 6  or  
27 . 6  basis point s . 
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Addit ional Evidence o n  Market Uncertainty 
To conf i rm our findings on the e f fects of market uncertainty on 
the issue cost d i fferential between pub l ic issues and private place-
ments we divide the samp l e  into p eriods o f  stable and unstable interest 
rate s . Table 6 gives the quarter ly average values of VOL over the 
s amp le period and shows that marke t uncertainty , as measured by VOL ,  
was quite hi gh during the years 1 980 and 1 98 1 . During this period VOL 
averaged 0 .  30 as compared wlth 0 .  2 3  over the ent ire samp le per iod . 
Furthermore , participants in the bond marke ts are in agreement that 
1 980 and 1 98 1  were periods of volatile interes t rates . Re garding 1 98 0 ,  
Kidder,  Peabody and Co . stated 
[ a] t no time in recent years we re markets more d i f f i cult 
than in 1 98 0 .  Ref lecting the influence of inf lat ion , gov­
e rnment policy , investor sent iment , corporate financing 
needs , and the interplay of national and internat iona l 
f inancial marke t s , long- and short-term intctfe s t  rates in 
1 980 were among the mos t  volat ile in history . 
In 1 98 1  Kidder ,  Peabody and Co.  reported that obta ining financing con-
t inued to be dif ficult becau s e  of "unprecedented market vo lat ility and 
uncert ainty w i th respect to the ec onomy . " 67  Thus , we id ent ify 1 98 0  and 
1 98 1  as periods of unstab le market condit ions . 
S t able periods we re more difficult to ident ify because practit ion-
era do not typ ically complain about the s e  periods . However ,  from 
Table 6 we are ab le to id ent ify some possible stable periods . Du ring 
1 9 7 9  and 1 98 2- 1 98 3 ,  VOL averaged only 0 . 1 5 as compared with 0 . 2 3 over 
66 Kidde r ,  Peabody , and Co . [ 40 ,  1 98 0 , p .  9 ] . 
6 7  Kidder ,  Peabody , and Co . [ 40 ,  1 98 1 ,  p .  4 ] . 
79  
TABLE 6 
VOLATILITY OF INTEREST RATES : 
1 9 7 9- 1 98 3  
Average Ave rage Long-Term 
Volatility Treasury Rate 
Year Quar ter (%) (%) 
1 9 79 I I I  0 . 06 8 . 9 9  
IV 0 . 2 2 1 0 . 00 
1 980 I 0 . 40 1 1 . 7 4 
I I  0 . 2 7  1 0 . 34 
I I I  0 . 1 9 1 0 . 85 
IV 0 . 3 8 1 2 . 00 
1 9 8 1  I 0 . 23 1 2 . 1 9  
I I  0 . 2 4 1 3 . 1 1  
I I I  0 . 2 9 1 4 . 2 8  
IV 0 . 3 7 1 3 . 4 6 
1 982 I 0 . 1 7  1 3 . 4 3  
II 0 . 1 9 1 3 . 2 7 
I I I  0 . 26 1 2 . 64 
IV 0 . 1 5  1 0 . 7 0 
1 983 I 0 . 1 2 1 0 . 6 1  
I I  0 . 1 4  1 0 . 5 2  
I I I  0 . 1 3  1 1 . 5 4  
IV 0 . 1 0  1 1 . 68 
Me an values 0 . 2 3 1 1 . 5 2  
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the entire sample period . More specif ically , Table 6 indicates that 
the third quarter of 1 9 7 9  and the ent ire year of 1 98 3  were relatively 
stable given the low values for VOL during these period s .  The fourth 
quarter of 1 9 7 9  was rej ected as a stab le period because it was in 
October 1 9 7 9  that the Federal Reserve Board began the policy of con-
trolling monetary aggregates rather than focusing on controllin g  
interest rates . Most economists and practitioners agree that interes t 
rates became more volat i le during this period . Additionally , Table 6 
indicates that 1 98 2  was a transition period when interest rate volatil-
ity was decreasing ; thus , we conducted tes ts wi th and without 1 982  
included as a stab le period . 
To test for cost differences during stable . and unstab le marke ts , 
we estimate Equat ion 5 . 4 ,  less VOL , for the periods ident ified above . 
We remove VOL from the model because we used it to divide the sample 
into stab le and unstable period s .  Table 7 cont ains the resu lts of the 
6 8  estimation . For brevity,  we report only the e s t imated coefficient s 
of PRIV.  The es t imated coefficients of the control variables are simi-
lar to those presented in Equat ion 5 . 3 .  For the unstab le market period 
( 1 980- 1 98 1 ) , the coefficient of PRIV is negative and significantly 
different from zero and suggests that on ave rage switch hitters s ave 
4 9  basis points by is suing debt privately rather than publicly when 
6 8  We e s t imat ed the model with and without VOL and the results were 
not affected . VOL was not significant during the stable periods ; how­
eve r ,  during the unstable period there was still  enough variat ion in 
VOL for it to obtain a significant coefficient . Other coefficients in 
the equat ion were unaffected . 
8 1  
TABLE 7 
YIELD OFF TREASURY REGRESSION ESTIMATES DURING STABLE 
AND UNSTABLE MARKETS 
Number of  PRIV 
Time Period I s su e s  Coefficient t value 
Unstab le Pe riod 
1 980- 1 98 1 1 34 -0 . 492 - 3 . 0 1  
S table Periods 
1 97 9  I I I  and 1 9 8 3  5 8  -0. 1 62 - 1 . 26 
1 9 79 I I I  and 1 98 2 - 1 9 8 3  1 28 0 . 205 1 . 2 4  
Adj u�ted 
R 
0 . 60 1  
0 . 702  
0 . 550 
8 2  
markets are uncertain. This result confirms our f inding from Equa­
t ion 5 .  4 that private placements may be  less expensive than public 
issues during unstable periods . 
For both periods of stable market conditions ( 1 97 9  I I I , and 1 98 3 ;  
1 9 7 9  I I I  and 1 98 2- 1 98 3) the coefficient of PRIV is not significantly 
different from zero and suggests that on average , swi tch hitters should 
not expect cost savings from issuing private ly rather than publicly 
during these periods . The cost advantage of private placements appears 
only during unstab le market conditions ; the f indin gs of Table 7 do not 
corroborate the cost reversal between private placements and public 
issues which we suggested ear l ier . Thus , during periods when market 
cond itions are stable , it appears that there is no cost advantage in 
either market on averag e ,  a result consistent with the f indings from 
the test of the first hypothesis ( Equat ion 5 . 3) .  
Non-Switch Hitters and the Agency Costs of Deb t  
This sect ion tests the two hypothe ses of whether agency costs  o f  
debt af fect the decision o f  non-switch hitters t o  issue debt exc lusive­
ly by private placement . The dissert at ion ' s third and fourth hypothe­
ses are restated below :  
3 .  I s suers who d o  not subs titute between market s  (non-switch 
hitters) find private p lacements less costly than publ ic sales 
o f  similar debt because agency costs are more easily resolved 
in the private marke t , ceteris paribus .  
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4 .  For non-switch hitters , issue cost savings f rom issuing pri­
vate ly rather than publicly increase as the agency costs o f  
debt increase , ceteris paribus . 
To test these hypothese s , we need to compare the forecasted public 
issue cost with the actual private issue cost of  non-switch hitters . A 
statistically significant coot s avings is evidence that they choose the 
least cost ly method of issuing debt . Then , we investigate the rela­
tionship between the estimated cost savings of private p lacement over 
public issues and agency costs of deb t .  
Hethodology for Non-Switch Hitter Tests 
To predict public issue cost for our sample of  18 issu es by non­
switch hitter s , we first estimate the new issue pricing model developed 
in Chapter 4 (Eq . 1 )  with our s ample of  236 public issues s o ld during 
1 979- 1 98 3 . The results appear in Table 8 ( Equation 8 . 1 ) . The model 
explains 5 7  percent of  the variat ion in YOT and is s imilar to Equa­
tion 5 . 3 .  All e s t imated coefficients obtain the predicted sign and are 
s tat ist ically d i f fe rent from zero at the one percent significance 
leve l .  Next , we forecast the public issue costs for non-switch hitters 
by  subs tituting their characteristics into Equat ion 8 . 1 .  Then we sub­
t ract the actual YOT from the forecasted YOT and obtain e s t imates o f  
the cost savings which non-switch hitters obtain b y  is suing privat e ly 
rather than public ly . 
We use the is suer ' s default risk as a proxy for the ex istence o f  
agency problems . Default r isk i s  a reasonab l e  proxy o f  agency cos ts o f  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Controls 
CONSTANT 
CALL 
S INK 
TREAS 
VOL 
S PREAD 
DRI SK 
Adj usted R2 
F stat is t ic 
Std .  Error 
Dep.  Mean 
Sample Size  
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TABLE 8 
NEW ISSUE PRIC ING MODEL FOR PUBLIC ISSUES 
Coefficient 
-0 . 9 1 9  
- 1 . 56 5  
-0 . 3 63 
0 . 1 8 6  
2 . 040 
0 . 36 1  
0 . 300 
0 . 567  
5 1 . 5  70 
0 . 585  
2 . 366 
236 
Equation ( 8  . 1 ) 
t value 
-2 . 65 
-8 . 65 
-3 . 6 1  
6 . 07 
6 . 00 
4 . 10 
9 . 5 1 a 
a The t value  for the coef ficient of DRISK is adj us ted by God frey ' s 
technique . The unadj usted t value for DRI SK was 9 . 5 3 .  
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69  debt for at  least two reasons . First ,  if we view the firm ' s equity 
as a Eu ropean option , owner-managers have an incentive to accept high 
risk proj ects which increase the value of the equity by increasing the 
variance rate of  the firm' s underlying assets . This acceptance o f  
riskier proj ects  means that bondholders bear higher default risk . 
S econd , informat ional asymmetry means that managers may be unab le to 
unambiguous ly communicate the t rue return distribution of  their proj -
ects to bondholders (or other outsiders) . This problem introduces 
uncert ainty about the f irm' s true characteristics and causes bond-
holders to perceive a higher probability of default . This information 
uncertainty means that bondholders bear higher default r isk.  
Given this discussion , we use the predicted bond ratings as a 
measure of  agency cos t s .  We estimate the bond ratings for non-switch 
h itters with the bond rat ing model discussed in Chapter 4 and developed 
in Appendix A. To determine which private is sues are below investment 
grad e ,  we apply the theory of order s t atistics to our default risk 
index , DRISK. The expected value of  the f irst order statistic for the 
sample of 236 publicly issued bonds is our e s t imate of the maximum 
70 value which DRISK obtains for investment grade issues . This pro-
cedure is reasonable because all of our public issues have bond ratings 
above investment grade . For our private samp l e ,  we clas s i fy issues 
6 9This list is not exhaustive.  There may be other reasons for 
default risk to p roxy agency problems . 
70  Professor John L .  Trimble suggested this technique in a doctoral 
seminar at the University of Tennes see .  Hsueh [ 30 ]  f irst applied it t o  
a sample of  nonrated municipal bonds . 
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w ith DRISK greater than 4 . 7 3  as below inves tment grade . We created two 
categories be low inves tment grade--BELOW1 for is sues with 4 . 73 < DRISK 
� 4 1 . 34 and BELOW2 for issues with DRISK > 4 1 . 34 .  
Table 9 reports the aver age predicted cost savin gs for non- swi tch 
h itters by rating category and for the ent ire samp l e . Th e t statistics 
are the predicted cost savings div ided by the standard e rror of the 
7 1  pred iction. The t value tests  the null hypothe s is that the predicted 
cost savings equal zero versus the alternative that the cost savings 
d iffer from zero . Table 9 also reports average issue size for each 
bond rating cat egory . 
F indings of Non-Swit ch Hitter Tests 
The result s  in Frame A of Table 9 show that on av erage , non-
swit ch hitters would have paid signif icant ly higher issue costs had 
7 2  they issued in the public markets . This result i s  consistent with 
7 1  The standard errors are computed as follows : 
� ( ef ) = s [ 1 
+ X (X ' X) - 1X ' ] 1
/ 2 
0 0 
where s is the standard error of Equat ion 8 . 1 , X is the ( l xk) vector 
o f  the is sue characteristics for each non-switch �itte r ,  and X is the 
(nxk) matrix of regressors f rom Equat ion 8 . 1 .  The t stat i s t ic s  have 
(n-k) degrees of freedom . 
7 2  We hesitate t o  argue that the s e  pred icted cost savin gs are 
reasonable . For example , Frame A of Table 9 suggests that non-switch 
hitters p ay 559 basis points less than they would issu ing publicly . 
This is clearly an unreasonab le cost savings to expect . However ,  we 
argue that the cost savin gs exist and are considerabl e .  The pred icted 
YOT for the non-switch hitters are higher than seem reasonab le because 
non-switch hitters are clearly beyond the bounds o f  DRISK of the sampl e 
used to e s t imate the public model . Table 3 (p . 6 3 )  shows that the 
average value for D RISK for non-swi t ch h it ters is 1 9 . 4 7  and for pub lic 
issues i s  1 . 36 .  Profe ssor Ronald E .  Shrieves suggested that the t rue 
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TABLE 9 
PREDICTED PUBLIC ISSUE COSTS OF NON-SWITCH HITTERS 
YOT 
Predicted 
Predicted Actual Cost  
Bond Rating Public P r ivate Savings Issue S ize 
( Predicted) {%)  (%)  (%)  t value ($ millions ) 
Frame A 
Entire 
Sample (n = 1 8 )  7 . 40  1 . 8 1  5 . 5 9  5 . 88 2 0 . 2  
Frame B 
Investment 
Grade (n = 8)  1 . 8 3  1 .  7 5  0 . 08 0 . 8 1  1 5 . 7  
Aa (n = 3 )  1 . 39 2 . 20 -0 . 8 1  1 . 35 
A (n = 2 )  1 . 6 1  1 . 2 9 0 . 32 0 . 54 
Baa (n = 3 )  2 . 4 1  1 . 6 0  0 . 8 1  0 . 22 
Frame c 
Below 
Investment 
Grade (n = 1 0 )  1 1 . 87 1 . 86  1 0 . 0 1  8 . 06 26 . 8  
BELOW1 (n = 6 )  8 . 3 1  1 .  37  6 . 94 7 . 3 8  
BELOW2 ( n  = 4 )  1 7 . 2  2 . 59 1 4 . 6 1  9 . 07  
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the third hypothesis which suggests  that non-switch hitters choose the 
least cost ly method of sal e .  The reason that non-swit ch hitt ers do not 
go to  the public market to is sue debt is  that the public alternat ive is 
much t oo cos t ly for them on a consis tent basis because of agency prob-
lems . However , we have not considered the degree of agency problems 
faced by non-swit ch hitters . 
The fourth hypothesis sugges t s  that the bene f i t s  o f  issuing debt 
by private p lacement should increase with the severity of agency prob-
lems . Thus , the cost  savings of issuing privately are greater for 
those non-swi tch hitters who exhibit higher default risk, and by infer-
ence , greater age.ncy costs of  debt . For investment grade issues , 
Frame B of  Table 9 shows that the predicted cost s avings are not sig-
n ificantly different from zero . This finding sugges t s  that non-switch 
hitters with o st ensibly good credit quality could have sold the ir debt 
publicly without incurring higher i s su e  costs . 
For the below investment grade issues , Frame C of Table 9 shows 
that the predicted cost savings are significantly greater than zero . 
These firms wou ld have paid substantially higher is sue costs had they 
issued publicly and we conclude that they have truly selected the least 
cos t ly method of  s ale . This result further supports  the third 
funct ional form of  DRISK might be quadratic or cubic and that a linear 
specificat ion would b ias YOT for extreme values of DRISK.  We  at tempted 
both quadratic and cubic func t ional forms for DRISK . The quadratic and 
cubic terms d id not enter the e quat ion significan t ly and the coeffi­
c ients were such that they would further increase the e s t imat es of  YOT 
b eyond reaso n .  Additionally , we converted DRISK to a z-score and used 
the area to the left of  the z-score on the normal curve as a proxy for 
d efault risk.  This also d id not improve the e s t imates . 
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hypothesis because i t  i s  likely that these f i rms suffer from costly 
agency problems which they can more easily resolve in the private d eb t  
market s .  Also not ice that the predicted c o s t  savings increase 
monotonically from BELOW! to BELOW2 . Th is finding further supports the 
predict ion of the fourth hypothesis that cost s avings from issu ing 
privately rather than publicly increase as agency costs  increase . 
Intere s t ingly , the average issu e  size  for below investment grade 
non-swit ch hitters is much greater than for investment grade issuers 
( $ 27 mil lion versus $ 1 6  million) . It  is possible that these issues are 
large enough to enj oy a successful publ ic sal e ;  however ,  high default 
risk ( symptomatic of  agency problems) l imits  the at t rac t iveness o f  
these issues in a secondary market .  
In sum, as a result of  agency problems below investment grade 
non-swit ch hitters choose the less cos t ly private p lacement as the 
method of  issu ing new debt , despite sufficient issue size to  sell pub-
lic ly.  On the  other hand , investment grade non-switch hitters may 
issue privately because their issues are too small  to enj oy a success­
ful public sale . 
Sunrrnary 
The preponderance of the evidence presented here sugges ts that 
p revious empirical studies of the private placement market found con­
sis tent cost s avings for pub l ic issues over private issues because o f  
insufficient data and the failure t o  make the distinct ion be tween 
swit ch hitt ers and non-switch hitters . In this study , we hold issue 
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characterist ic s  and market condit ions constan t  and reveal that there is  
no cost difference on average between private issues by swit ch hitters 
and public  issues during normal market conditions . The inst itutional 
facts of the private placement market indicate that swit ch hitters 
issue private deb t  that looks very s imilar to the debt they is sue in 
publ ic market s .  I f  debt markets  are effic ient , we would expect for the 
two methods  to of fer the same issue cost , ceteris paribus . The empiri­
cal results  ind icate that these f irms view the two forms of debt as 
c lose subst itutes since we find no sign ificant cost difference . Howev­
er , the resul ts also show that credit market uncertainty may provide 
the incent ive for switch hitters to issue  debt privately . The evidence 
supports the not ion that switch hitters achieve issue cost s avings 
during periods of uncertain market conditions . 
The results of the tests on non-swit ch hitters support an economic 
rationale for the existence of the private placement market .  In the 
face of agency problems , f irms who would find it cost ly to issue debt 
publicly use the private p lacement market as a cost'-effec t ive alter­
native . The nature of the private p lacement allows for relat ively 
inexpens ive resolution of agency probl ems . The tests indicate that 
below inve stment grade issues by non-switch hitters would have had 
substantially higher issue cos t s  had they been issued pub licly . S ince 
these f irms are presumed to have excessive agency problems from the 
p erspect ive of the public marke t s , we conclude that they issue private­
ly on a consistent basis . The results presented here also support the 
not ion that these firms choose to issue  privately . This finding 
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clarifies st atements in previous studies sugges t ing that there are 
f irms who are con fined to the private placemen t marke t . 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Th is di ssertation explains the observed issue cost di fference s  
between private placements and public issues b y  public  ut i l ities 
between 1 97 9  and 1 98 3  and determines : ( 1 )  whether private and public  
debt have the same is sue cost for swit ch hitter s ,  ceteris  paribus ;  
( 2 )  whe ther issue cost differences between public  issues and private 
placements by switch hitters vary with the degree of market uncertain­
ty;  ( 3 )  whether non-switch hitters choose to issu e  d eb t  privately 
because the agency costs of debt c an be reso lved less expensive ly in 
the p r ivate market than in the public market ; and (4)  whether the co s t  
s avings o f  private placemen ts by non-swi t ch hitters increase a s  agency 
costs increase.  To test  the dissertat ion ' s hypoth ese s ,  we  us e ordinary 
least s quares regress ion to e s t imate is sue cost equat ions for new deb t  
issues . The sampl e  consists o f  2 36 negotiated issues and 5 7  p r ivate 
p lacements o f  pub l ic utility debt s old between June 1 9 7 9  and D ecember 
1 98 3 .  
The Private Placement Marke t 
The private placement is a me thod o f  issuing new debt in wh ich 
( 1 )  the issuer and the investor d i rectly nego t iate the terms of the 
issue , and ( 2 )  title to the securities passes d irectly to the investor . 
The private pl acement marke t developed in the 1 9 30s in response to the 
institutional izat ion of savings and to the increased cost of issuing 
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d ebt publicly unde r  the regist ration and disclosure requirements o f  the 
Securities Act of  1 9 3 3 .  
The private placement market i s  distinguished from the public debt 
market by the following characterist ics : ( 1 )  a more personal relation­
ship between borrowers and lenders ; ( 2 )  a lesser role played by the 
investment banke r ; ( 3 )  lower f lotation cost s ; ( 4 )  speedier issuance o f  
securities ; and ( 5 )  greater flexibility in the design and renegot iation 
of the debt contrac t .  Private  lenders are the large inst itutional 
inve s t ors : life insurance companies and pension fund s . These lenders 
are attracted by high after-tax yields , the opportunity t o  purchas e 
large b locks of securities , and the benefits of  a more detailed credit 
analysis . Borrowers in the private p lacement market can be c lass i f ied 
as switch hitters or  non-switch hitters . Switch hitters are large 
f irms of  high credit quality who subst itute between public debt and 
private p lacement s .  Non-switch hitters are small , risky f i rms who do  
not substitute between marke t s . 
Cost Differences Between Private and Public Issues 
There are two conflict ing arguments  as to  which method of  sale 
results in the lowest issue cos t .  On one hand , pub lic issues should 
have l ower issue costs because of greater search and marketab i l ity 
avail able in the public  market .  On the other hand , private placements 
could have lower issue costs because of a less expensive resolution o f  
debt-related agency problems and lower flotation cos t s . Further , pri­
vate placements  may h ave a cost advantage over public  is sues during  
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periods of  high market uncertainty . The conflict is  resolved when we 
estab l ish that swit ch hitters and non-swit ch hitters have dif ferent 
motivations for us ing the private placement market .  In the f inal anal­
ysis , we conc lude that firms choose the method of sale that bes t  fits  
their particular circumst ances , and hence results  in the lowest borrow­
ing cost . 
Summary o f  the Findings and Conclus ions 
The dissertat ion ' s  evidence suggests  that for switch hitters there 
is no consistent cost difference between private issues and public 
sale s .  This indicates that switch hitters view the two forms of deb t  
a s  close sub s t itutes . However,  during periods o f  high credit market 
uncertainty such as 1 980-1 98 1 ,  switch hit ters can s ave an average of  4 9  
b asis point s b y  is suing privately . We found no statistically signifi­
cant cost difference during stab le periods such as 1 9 7 9  I I I  and 1 98 3 .  
The result s  of  the tests  on non-switch hitters support a st rong 
economic rat ionale for the existence of the private placement marke t .  
The tests indicate that below investment grade is sues by non-switch 
hitters would have had substantially higher issue costs had they been 
issued pub l icly . We also find that the es timated issue cost savings of  
issuing privately increase monotonically with our  proxy for agency 
costs of debt { d efault risk) . Because these firms are presumed to have 
high agency cos ts of d ebt from the perspective of public marke t s ,  we 
conclude that below investment grade non-switch hitter s  issue privately 
to resolve agency problems at lower cost than in the pub l ic market . 
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Further , w e  find that investment grade non-switch hi tters would have 
paid the s ame issue cos t ,  ceteris paribus ,  had they is sued pub l ic ly .  
The f indings suggest that inves tment grade non-switch hitt ers did not 
have large enough issues to facilitate a successful publ ic s ale . 
Thus , this study resolves the controversy between academic re-
searchers and finance pract i t ioners over whe ther private placement o f  
new issu es of  corporate debt is  more expens ive than public sale . The 
f indings suppo rt the view of the f inance pract itioners that their f irms 
have good economic reasons for issuing debt privately . The ev idence 
shows that switch h itters may lower their issue costs during uncert ain 
markets  by issuing privately rather than publicly and that non-switch 
hitters incur lower agency cos ts  of  debt by issuing privately.  Thus , 
any ob served cost differences are explained by an issue ' s  character-
istics and market condit ions at the t ime of issu e .  Other studies found 
these s i gnificant cost differences because they did not have the data 
necessary to hold important factors constant for individual issues . 
Further , these stud ies did no t attempt to account for the different 
mot ivations of swit ch hitters and non-swit ch hitt ers for borrowing 
privately . 
Limitations of  the S tudy and Suggest ions 
for Future Research 
We should be careful not to ascribe the resu l t s  obtained with this 
samp le of  publ ic utilities to  corporate issuers in general . We chose 
to study publ ic utilities because data was easily ob tainab l e  and a more 
homogeneous sample was des ired . Debt issues in different indu st ries 
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may be priced differently and thus , any study o f  lndustrial private 
placements  should control for industry differences . However , we expect 
that the theory developed in this dissertation is  robust and will  apply 
equally well to industrial issue s . 
The empirical results  regarding the role of market uncertainty in 
the decis ion of switch hit ters t o  issue private ly may depend on which 
measure of market uncertainty is used . S ome earlier studies have used 
the mean absolute d eviat ion of  past interest rates as a measure o f  
market uncertaint y .  This study employs the standard deviation of  pas t 
interest  rates as its proxy . A crit icism of both of  these measures is 
that they are ex-post measures  of  uncertainty . They merely tell us the 
variability of  past interest rate s ;  they do not represent t rue expec­
t ations of future interest rate movements without nontriv ial stat is­
t ical and economic as sumpt ions (perhaps ,  rational expectat ions ) . 
Anothe r  pos sible crit icism of these measures is that empirical results  
obt ained with them may be sensit ive t o  the  length of t ime over which 
they are computed . Given that these measures have been wide ly used in 
studies of the costs of is suing new securitie s ,  it will be worthwhile 
t o  develop a market uncertainty measure that not only ref lects how 
underwriters actually price new issues , but also is grounded in one o f  
the basic theoretical paradigms in financ e .  Future research o n  this 
t opic should inc lude a sensit ivity analysis to  determine t he impact o f  
d if ferent measures of  market uncert ainty on emp irical result s .  
This d issertation d id not explici t ly test  for which factors are 
important determinants of the publ ic-private borrowing decision . In 
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future research w e  will employ qualitative dependent variable t ech­
niques to test  for issue characteristics and market condit ions that 
s ignificantly inf luence a firm ' s  decision to issue privately .  These 
techniques explicitly model the f irm ' s choice of method of sal e .  For 
non-switch hitters , this analysis may reveal the nature of the agency 
problems experienced by these f irms in terms of financial variables 
which indicate h igh agency cost s .  
Finally, in the tests for non-switch hitters , we implicitly 
assumed that there is  a high correlation between d efault  risk measures 
and agency cost s .  This is clear ly a not ion that warrants  further 
study . In part icular , future researchers should develop a theory of  
the relationship be tween default r isk and agency problems and then test  
for the importance of  this relationship . 
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DEFAULT RI SK MEASUREMENT 
This appendix develops a measure of default risk for public 
utility private p lacements which are not rated by the bond rating 
agencies . One possible approach would be to  rate private p lacements 
with a bond rating model estimated for a samp le o f  rated , public ly sold 
utility bonds . This approach is not practical because new public 
issues by pub l ic ut ilities typically do not receive ratings b elow 
inves tment grade . This means that it would not be possible to use a 
straightforward c lass ification model  to  ord inally rank private plac e­
ments on default risk since issu ers in the private p lacement market are 
likely to  have characteristics which would result in a below investment 
grade rating were they to receive a published agency rating . Thus , by 
applying a c lass i fication model based only on inves tment grade bonds , 
we would be estimat ing ratings beyond the bounds of the sample used to  
estimate the classification mode l .  In the case of  a multiple discrimi­
nant analysis model , below investment grade bonds classified in this 
manner would s imply be placed into the lowest bond rating category o f  
the model .  I n  this case , bonds whose actual characteristics indicate 
that they are really a B rated bond , would b e  classified as Baa,  since 
that is  the lowest category that the model "knows . "  To naively apply 
such a model to private p lacements would mean that there would be sub­
stantial variation of bond quality among bonds classified into the Baa 
rating category , and hence this informat ion would be of l i t t le value in 
ident ifying the level of d efault risk for a part icular private place­
ment with "below investment grade" characteris t ic s .  Fortunate ly , 
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McKelvey and Zavoina [ 4 6  J have deve loped a methodo logy . n-cho tomous 
p robit , which can be ex tended to deal with th is problem. 
Probit Methodol ogy 
Assume that there is  a variable of theoret ical intere s t , Y ,  wh ich 
satis f ie s  
Y = x a  + u 
where Y is the nx1 vector o f  measurements on the dependent variab l e ,  a 
is a 1 x {K+ 1 )  vector of unknown slope coef f i ci ents ,  X is a nx { K+ l )  
matr ix of independent variables {X0 = 1 for all observations ) ,  and u is  
a nx l  vector of normally distribut ed random d i sturbance terms with mean 
2 0 and variance-covariance matrix a I .  Let us as sume that we canno t 
direct ly observe Y .  We could e s t imate Eq . { 1 )  by ordinary lea s t  
squares , b u t  w e  can only observe a n  ordinal representation of Y, Z ,  
which does n o t  satisfy the assumpt ions o f  ordinary least squares est i-
mat ion . Z is a categorical variable with M response categories 
R
1 , • • •  , � aris ing from the underlying , unobserved dependent var i­
able in the fol lowing manner .  First , as sume an ext ended real line with 
real numbers �0 • � 1 • • . •  , �M where �O = -� and �M = +� , and with �O � 
. . . s Z is  defined by Y as follows : 
<=> { 2 )  
No te that n o  as sump t ion has been made a s  to th e s i z e  o f  th e interval 
[ � i-1 ' �i
] ; ordinary least squares would as sume equal interval s .  I f  Xj 
1 09 
i s  the vector of independent variables for observation j ( letting x0j = 
1 for all j ) we can write 
� .  1 < Y .  � � . <=> � .  1 � L � . X  • .  + u . � � . 1 - J 1 1 - 1 1J J 1 <=> 
( � .  1 - L � . X  . . ) /a <  u . / a � ( � .  + L � L X  . . ) /a 1 - 1 1J J J 1 1J ( 3 )  
Since we have assumed in Eq .  ( 1 ) that u i s  multivariate normal , we can 
write 
PR[ Z .  E R_ ] = w [ ( � . - Lf L X  . . ) / a ] - w [ ( � .  1 - L I L X  . . ) /a ] ( 4) J -K 1 1 1J 1- 1 1J 
where w ( . )  is the cumulative standard normal dens ity function . Since 
any linear transformation of the underlying variable Y also applied to 
�O , �1 , • • • , � would lead to model ( 4 ) ,  we identify the model by 
assuming that �1 = 1 and a = 0 . Thus we get 
PR [ Z .  E Rk
] = � [ ( � .  - L � . X  . •  ] - � [ � .  1 - L � . Xi . ]  J 1 1 1J 1- 1 J ( 5 )  
To estimate the M+K- 1 parameters o f  Eq .  ( 5 ) , �2 • . . • , �- 1 and 
�O ' . , �k we def ine Z as a series of dummy variables such that 
Zj k  = 1 if Zj E Rk'  and 0 otherwise . Thus we can rewrite Eq .  ( 5 )  as 
Pr [ Zj k  = 1
] - �j , k - �j , k- 1 
and the likelihood of Z given f ixed values of  the parameters i s  
L = L ( Z I �o ·  • • •  , �k '  �2 ' • • •  , �- 1 ) 
and the log l ikelihood function is  
L* = logL = LE [ Z . klog( � .  k - � .  k- 1 ) ]  J J ,  J ,  
( 6 ) 
( 7 )  
( 8 )  
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The log likelihood function is maximized subj ect to the constraint that 
�1 � �2 � . . .  � �- 1 • McKelvey and Zavoina have wr itten a computer 
program which solves for the M+K- 1 unknowns . 
Once we have solved for �2 , . , �- 1 and 130 , • • •  , f3k it is 
poss ible to predict the probability that Z .  is in each of the M J 
response categories given values for the independent variables . Let-
ting pjk  be the predicted probability that zj is in the kth category, 
we can write 
( 9 )  
I t  is also possible to predict values of the underlying ( unobserved) , 
theoretical variable Y for a particular observation given the maximum 
likelihood estimates of 
i . e .  • y = l.: f3 . X  . .  1 1J 
Kaplan and Urwitz [ 37 ]  appl ied the n-chotomous probit model to the 
problem of predicting agency rat ings . They pos it that pro bit is a 
superior methodology to either multiple regression or multiple dis -
criminant analys is in this particular application s ince bond ratings 
are .ordinal as well as categorical measure of default risk . The probit 
methodology explici tly uses the ordinal information in bond ratings . 
Kaplan and Urwitz argued for the existence of a theoretical 
( unobservable) measure of default risk which is only evidenced through 
the existence of ordinal , categorical bond ratings . From the estima-
tion of the probit model for the sample of rated bonds I will obtain 
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maximum likelihood estimates of 130 , . . . , �k and J.L2 , . . • , J.!M- l .  I 
will then apply the estimated 13 ' s to the samples of rated bonds and 
nonrated private placements to obtain estimates for the underlying , 
theoretical measure of default risk , Y .  This method avoids the problem 
of assigning noninvestment grade private placements to the Baa category 
s ince the estimated J.L ' s  partition the entire real ; i . e . , Y can poten­
tially attain values anywhere on the real line , and given the con­
straint built into the maximum likel ihood estimation we are guaranteed 
a cons istent , ordinal ranking of bonds on default risk . This measure 
of default risk will represent default risk in the empirical model 
developed in Chapter 4 .  
Discussion of the Variables 
This sect ion discusses variables to be used in the empirical mode l 
which explains the variat ion in Moody ' s  ratings for the sample of 
publicly issued ut ility bonds . Previous studies suggest  that bond 
ratings are determined by a firm' s financial condition , . the environment 
in which the firm operates , the characterist ics of the bond contract , 
and by overall economic conditions . The model employed in this study 
includes explanato ry variables from each of these categories . 
The variables used in this appendix are based on models of bond 
ratings by Altman and Katz (AK) [ 2 ]  and Kidwell , Marr and Ogden (KMO )  
[ 4 1 ] .  Additionally , environmental variables and issue specific vari­
ables are inc luded because they are considered important by Tripp-Howe 
[ 60 ]  and Standard and Poor ' s  [ 5 7 ]  as determinants of default risk. 
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Variables Measuring Financial Condit ion 
ASSETS is total asset s in billions of dollars . This variable 
measures the size of the f irm. We typically observe that larger firms 
tend to have more stable earnings than smaller firms and thus tend to 
have lower defau lt risk. 
CFREL is cash flow divided by current liab ilities . Cash f low is 
defined as earnings before interest and t ax ,  less preferred dividends . 
This variable is a coverage or liquid ity measure which tells the number 
of t imes that the firm' s earnings cover short-te rm obligations . 
CWTA is the dollar amount of const ruct ion work in progress rela­
t ive to total as set s .  Wingler and Watts  [ 6 5 ]  have shown that r egula­
tory treatment of  charges t o  cu rrent construct ion p roj ects  adversely 
affects the account ing quality of earnings for public  utilities . 
DEPREV is depreciation d ivided by operating revenues . This vari­
able is an e f f iciency measure which indicates the rate of asset con­
sumption per dollar of sales . The lower this rate , the more sales a 
given dol lar of as sets generates and thu s , the more efficient the f irm. 
EASA is earnings before interest and tax per dol lar of  operat ing 
revenues .  This variable is a measure of prof it ability indicat ing the 
amount of operat ing earnings per dol lar of sales . 
GRSALE is the growth rate of  sales over the last three years . 
Firms whose sales are growing rapidly are likely to be more profitable 
and henc e ,  more ab le to meet debt obligat ions than f irms with lower or 
negat ive sales growth rates . 
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LNTI is the natural logarithm of t imes interest earned . Times 
interest  earned measures h ow many t imes the f irm ' s  earnings cover 
7 3  current interest payments .  
LPTA i s  long-term debt plus preferred stock relative to total 
assets based on face value s .  S ince f irms employing more leverage are 
usually considered more risky , LPTA is included to control for differ-
ences in leverag e .  RETA is ret a ined earnings d ivided by total asset s .  
This variable  i s  another leverage measure .  A greater amount of  
ret ained earnings means that total  asse ts is composed of a higher pro-
port ion of equity.  
REVTA is operating revenue relative to  total assets . This vari-
able measure the efficiency of the f irm' s use of its  assets s ince it 
indicates the amount of revenue generated per dollar of total asset s .  
SDEA and SDTI are s tability measures . They are the s tandard 
d eviat ion ove r  the last nine years of earnings after int erest and 
before t ax and t imes intere st earned , respect ively . 
Variables Measuring the Firm' s Environment 
NUKE is a zero-one variab le where NUKE = 1 means that the firm i s  
somehow involved with the u s e  o f  nuclear power--it either h a s  exist ing 
nuclear generat ion capacity or nuclear capacity under construction at 
the t ime of issue . NUKE = 0 for all other firms .  Recent events such 
as the Three Mile Is land accident and the Washington Pub l ic Power 
7 3Kidwe l l , Marr , and Ogden [ 4 1 ]  found that this funct ional form 
performed best in their bond rating model .  
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System default , as well as a growing social movement oppos ing nucle ar 
power ind icates that firms with nuclear exposure operate in a more 
risky environment than other f irms . 
REG1 -REGS is a series of dummy variables which indicates the 
severity of the f irm ' s  regulatory environment .  The five variables 
correspond to the categories into which Duf f  and Phelps classify 
s everity of state regulat ion. REG1  equals 1 if the firm is subj ect t o  
the least s t rict regulation and equals 0 otherwise , and REGS equals 1 
if  the f irm i subj ect to the mos t  strict regulation and equals 0 other­
wise . F i rms regulated by federal agencies such as the Fede ral Communi­
cations Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are 
assigned to Duff and Phelps ' f irst category s ince federal regulation is 
considered to be less severe than state regulat ion in general . 
A series of  industry dummy variables is used to measure di ffer­
ences in default risk att r ibuted to indust ry d i f fe rence s .  The cate­
gories are gas p ipelines (GAS = 1 ,  0 otherwise) , electric companies 
( ELEC = 1 ,  0 otherwise) , and gas-electric combinations ( COMBO = 1 ,  0 
otherwise) . 
Is sue Characteris t ics 
S INK is a zero-one variable where SINK = 1 if  the issue has a 
sinking fund and S INK = 0 otherwise .  The study by KMO suggests  that 
the periodic retirement of principal may reduce default risk. 
SUBORD is a zero-one variable where SUBORD = 0 for f irst mortgages 
(which are presumed senior to all other forms of  deb t) and SUBORD = 1 
l l S  
for all other issues . SUBORD control s  for the fact that first mort-
gages are considered more secure than other forms of debt . 
Economic Condit ions 
SPREAD is the benchmark pricing variable for new debt is sues . I t  
i s  measured a s  the average yield on public utilities less the average 
yield on long-term Treasury issues . S ince SPREAD can also be regarded 
as the average risk premium for public utilit ie s ,  it is a contracycli-
cal variable . During periods when SPREAD is high , the economy is in 
rece s s ion and some researchers believe that all issues carry more 
74 defau lt risk during "bad" economic t ime s .  On the other hand , SPREAD 
is relatively low during expansions , and we expect that all issues are 
considered less r isky during "good" economic t ime s .  Thus the re may b e  
a tendency f o r  new issues to obtain lower ratings in recessions and 
7 5 higher rat ings in expansions . SPREAD is included in the model t o  
control f o r  the fact that the issues in the sample were sold at d i f fer-
ent points in the business  cycle . 
Data 
The data used for this s tudy cons ist of  2 36 new is sues of public  
u tility debt  ( excluding debt  issued by t e lephone companie s )  from June 
1 979  to December 1 98 3 .  Informat ion on issue characteristics was t aken 
7 4  
S e e  Van Horne [ 6 1 ] , Jaf fee  [ 32 ] , and Benson , Kidwell ,  Koch , and 
Rogowski [ 5 ] . 
7 5
This is a logical extension of Van Horne ' s  "f light to quality" 
argument to the new issue market .  
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from Drexe l ,  Burnham and Lambert ' s Public Of ferings of Corporate 
S ecuritie s  and Ebasco ' s Analysis of Pub lic Ut ility Financing . Data 
used to construct financial ratios were obtained f rom Moody ' s Public 
Utility Manual , S t andard and Poor ' s  COMPUSTAT tapes , Duff and Phelps , 
and NUS Corporat ion . Table 1 0  shows the mean characteristics of  the 
samp le by bond rat ing category . 
Results of the P robi t  Analysis  
The results of the probit estimat ion are shown in  Table 1 1 .  The 
model performs well ,  explaining 60 percent of the e s t imated total vari­
ation in the underlying default  risk index and categoriz ing 69 percent 
of the issues corre c t ly.  Eight of the variables obtain coefficient s 
that are signif icant ly dif ferent from z ero . 
Variables that are p articularly important determinant s of  default  
risk are LNTI , LPTA , SUBORD , NUKE and D EPREV . LNTI is  the interes t 
coverage measure . The negative coefficient for LNTI sugge s t s  that 
firms with greater interest coverage have lower default risk. LPTA 
measure the firm ' s use of leverage .  The positive coefficient for LPTA 
indicates that firms with higher leverage have higher default risk. We 
expect this result s ince firms employing large amounts of leverage have 
high fixed obligations of interest payments .  SUBORD obtains a posit ive 
s ign . This is consistent with the idea that debt issues with subordi-
. nate c la ims agains t  the f irm ' s assets  in bankrupt cy are regarded as 
being more risky . NUKE obtains a positive sign . This result indicat es 
that firms exposed to nuclear risks are considered to have higher 
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TABLE 1 0  
MEAN CHARACTERISTICS FOR SAMPLE O F  PUBLIC UT ILITY BONDS 
US ED IN PROBIT ANALYS IS OF BOND RATINGS 
Ent ire Sample A a A Baa 
Variable (n = 236) (n = 4 6 )  (n  = 1 18 )  (n = 7 2 )  
Qualitative Variables (%)  
NUKE 7 2 . 0  65 . 2  7 3 . 7  7 3 . 6  
S INK 1 8 . 2 15 . 2  1 9 . 5  1 8 . 1  
SUBORD 2 0 . 3  4 . 3  1 7 . 8  34 . 7  
GAS 1 9 . 9 1 3 . 0  22 . 9  1 9 . 4  
ELEC 6 2 . 3  63 . 0  6 2 . 7  6 1 . 1  
COMBO 1 7 . 8  24 . 0  1 4 . 4  1 9 . 5  
REGl 1 6 . 5  1 3 . 0  20 . 3  1 2 . 5  
REG2 1 9 . 5  1 9 . 6  28 . 8  4 . 2  
REG3 1 5 . 7  1 5 . 2  1 7 . 8  1 2 . 5  
REG4 3 3 . 5  3 9 . 1. 25 . 4  4 3 . 1  
REGS 1 5 . 6  1 3 . 1 7 . 7  2 7 . 7  
Quant itat ive Variables 
DEPREV 0 . 06 0 . 06 0 . 06 0 . 06 
REVTA 0 . 58 0 . 56 0 . 6 1  0 . 54 
LNTI 1 . 02 1 . 20 1 . 05  0 . 86  
CFREL 0 . 78 0 . 8 2  0 . 82 0 . 70 
LPTA 0 . 45 0 . 4 3  0 . 44 0 . 4 7 
RETA 0 . 1 1  0 . 1 2  0 . 1 2 0 . 09 
EASA 0 . 25 0 . 23 0 . 24 0 . 2 6 
CWTA 0 . 2 2  0 . 1 5  0 . 2 1  0 . 2 7 
SDEA 8 . 5 1  6 . 44 9 . 1 1  8 . 85 
SDTI 0 . 62 0 . 68 0 . 60 0 . 6 2  
GRSALE 0 . 25 0 . 10 0 . 1 3 0 . 5 3 
SPREAD 2 . 30 2 . 28 2 . 28 2 . 35 
ASSETS 3 . 36 2 . 47 3 . 90 3 . 03 
Explanatory 
Variabl e  
Intercept 
DEPREV 
REVTA 
LNTI 
CFREL 
LPTA 
RETA 
EASA 
CWTA 
NUKE 
SDEA 
SDTI 
GRSALE 
SUBORD 
SINK 
REG2 
REG3 
REG4 
REGS 
ELEC 
COMBO 
SPREAD 
ASSETS 
E s t imated R 2 
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TABLE 1 1  
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR PROBIT ANALYSIS  OF 
BOND RATINGS OF  PUBLICLY ISSUED BONDS 
Probit Rating Mode l 
C oef . t value 
-0 . 744 -0 . 50 
- 1 5 . 4 2 6  -2 . 02 
2 . 070  3 . 95 
-3 . 7 1 6  -6 . 52 
-0 . 3 6 1  -0 . 98 
4 . 832 2 . 65 
4 . 58 6  1 . 9 2  
8 . 2 90 4 . 20 
-0 . 7 9 1  -0 . 7 3  
0 . 92 1  2 . 80 
0 . 020 1 . 2 1  
-0 . 020 -0 . 1 3 
0 . 049  0 . 35 
1 . 899  5 . 90 
-0 . 1 48 -0 . 40 
-0 . 340 -0 . 9 6  
-0 . 009 -0 . 02 
0 . 009  0 . 1 0 
0 . 086 1 . 1 1  
-0 . 23 7  -0 . 7 5 
-0 . 1 45 -0 . 38 
0 . 2 1 7  .. 1 . 08 
-0 . 045 -0 . 9 5 
0 . 600 
Percent Corre c t ly C ategoriz ed 6 8 . 600 
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d efault risk . D EPREV is a measure of  efficiency . Its  negative sign 
indicates that f i rms with greater as set  turnover per dollar of operat-
ing revenues have lower default risk than less efficient firms . 
REVTA , RETA and EASA also obtain coefficients significantly dif-
f erent from zer o .  The profitab ility measure ,  REVTA and EASA obtain 
positive  s i gns . This result seems to indicate that more profitable  
firms are  more risky .  However ,  if profitable firms t end to use more 
leverage than less profitable firms , then the profi tab ility measure may 
be proxies for high leverage .  Thu s , a positive relationship with 
default risk resu lt s .  Further , these two profitability measures also 
indicate t he sensit ivi ty of a f irm ' s profitab i lity to changes in 
selling prices or volume of  business . As such , they may indicate 
greater default risk. 76  RETA is an indicator of potential insolvency . 
Thus , higher values of RETA would seem to indicate lower default risk , 
meaning that it  should obtain a negative sign. However , RETA . obtains a 
posit ive sign because firms with higher default  risk tend t o  have 
77  smaller asset  bases on  average . 
Comparisons with O ther S tudies 
In order t o  validate the spec ification of the model  shown in 
Table 1 1 ,  comparisons are made with the results  obtained in other 
studies . Table 12 compares the specifications of the model developed 
7 6  S ee d i scussion b y  S t andard and Poor ' s  [ 5 7 , p .  3 2 ] . 
7 7  Altman and Katz [ 2 ]  also ob tained this resul t . I t  i s  als o 
possible that the sign on REVTA was affected by the same phenomenon. 
120  
TABLE 1 2  
COMPARIS ON OF SPECIFICAT�ONS 
OF BOND RATING MODELS 
Variable Blackwel l  KU KMO JJA AK P S J  
ASSETS  X X X X X X 
DEPREV X X 
REVTA X X X X X 
LNTI X X X X X X 
CFREL X X X 
LPTA X X X X X 
RETA X X 
EASk X X 
CWTA X X 
NUKE X 
SDEA X X X X 
SDTI X X X 
GRSALE X X 
SUBORD X X X X 
SINK X X 
REGULATION X X 
INDUSTRY X X X X X 
SPREAD X 
* 
X indicates that a variable or a reasonable proxy is in the model  
o f  the paper indicated .  
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in this append ix with model specifications in studies b y  Altman and 
Katz [ 2 ]  (AK) , Kaplan and Urwitz [ 37 ]  (KU) , Pinches ,  S ingleton and 
Jahankhani [ 4 9 ]  (PSJ) , Kidwe l l ,  Marr and Ogden [ 4 1 ]  (KMO ) , and Jones , 
Jackson and Anderson [ 36 ]  (JJA) . Table 1 2  shows that my model contains 
variab les that have been used in past studies of bond ratings with two 
excep tions . NUKE and SPREAD have not been used in previous studies . 
While SPREAD was not a significant determinant of default risk in my 
model ,  the coe f ficient on NUKE shows that firms with nuc le ar exposure 
have significant ly higher default  risk. 
Some variables used in other studies are not included in my model .  
AK included the ratio o f  market value of  equity to book value o f  d eb t  
and return on equity . I d i d  n o t  u s e  these variab les because I was 
unab le to obtain the measures for all of the issues in the sample . KU 
and JJA included measures of systematic risk of the firms '  equity in 
their  models . KU found tha t  8 is a significant determinant of bond 
ratings while JJA find that it isn ' t .  Other studies also obtain mixed 
results on whether a i s  important in pred icting bond ratings . 
S chwendiman and Pinches [ 5 1 ]  f ind that bond ratings are associated with 
the systematic risk of a f irm ' s  common stock , while Reilly and Joehnk 
[ SO ]  f ind it to be an unimportant determinant of  bond rat ings . In view 
of these conflicting results I do not include 8 as a variable in my 
model .  The two variables  SDEA and SDTI which I include in the mode l 
are reasonable  measures of firm specific risk . Additional ly , there is  
little theory to suggest a relationship between the d efault risk of  a 
firm' s debt and the systematic  risk of  its  common stock . 
1 2 2  
The explanatory power of  my model  compares favorab ly with the 
models in the exist ing bond rat ing literatur e . Tab l e  1 3  summariz es the 
explanatory power of  the various models considered here . 
KU , KMO , and JJA employ probit to  estimate  bond rat ings . Thus , my 
model of  bond ratings is directly comparable with theirs . The e s t i-
2 mated R o f  my model  is well below that obtained by KU and KMO . JJA do 
2 not report e s t imated R s ince they probably view the measure to be of  
l imited usefulness . This goodness of  f it measure is  only an est imate 
because it  is  based on the estimated total variation in the e s t imated 
values of the underlying default risk index. S ince we cannot observe 
the true values of the underlying measure of default risk , we do not 
2 know the t rue value of R for the probit model .  Thus , comparing the 
models on e s t imated R2 may not be appropriate . On percent correctly 
categorized , my model  compares favorably with the o ther probit model s .  
Only the KMO model c lassifies a greater percentage o f  the issues c or-
rect ly than my model .  On this dimension, my model performs consider-
ably better than the other probit models examined . 
In order t o  compare the explanatory power of my model with the 
models of AK and PSJ , I e s t imate a quadratic di scriminant model for my 
78  d ata . AK and PSJ estimated bond ratings for electric  utilit ies . I 
deleted gas companies and gas/electric combinations from my samp le in 
78  PSJ used linear d is criminant analysis . AK used quadratic dis-
criminant analysis to control for the he terogeneity of the within group 
covariance matrices . I performed the l ikelihood rat io test for the 
homogeneity of  the within group covariance mat rices in my sample  and 
rej ect ed the null  hypothesis of  homogeneity .  Thus , I employed qua­
dratic discriminant analysis . 
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TABLE 1 3  
COMPARISON OF THE EXPLANATORY POWER 
OF BOND RAT ING MODELS 
Models 
Probit 
Blackwel l  (n = 236) 
KU 
KMO 
JJA 
D iscriminant 
Blackwe l l  (n = 1 4 7) 
PSJ 
AK 
* 
Not reported . 
2 E s t imated R 
0 . 60 
0 . 8 1  
0 . 7 6 
* 
Percent Correct ly 
Classified 
6 8 . 6  
6 2. 0  
7 2.4 
5 1 . 0  
8 5 . 0  
7 0 . 6  
85 . 0  
1 2 4  
order to  make the comparison more reasonable . My model classifies 
85 percent of  the issues into the correct bond rat ing category. This 
f igure is substantially higher than the percent correctly categorized 
obtained by PSJ and equals the f igure obtained by AK. It is worth 
noting that AK has the highest p ercent correct ly classified of  any 
publ ished study of bond rat ings which I have reviewed . 
Conclusion 
The bond rat ing model developed and estimat ed in this appendix is 
reasonable and performs comparably to other models in bond rating 
literatur e .  The spec ificat ion of my model is reasonable as compared 
with exi s t ing s tudies of bond ratings . In addit ion , my use of  NUKE as 
a determinant of default risk is a minor contribution to the bond 
rating literature . Additionally , the explanatory power of my model 
clearly meets or exceeds any reasonable standard of correct classifica­
t ion rates in the exis ting literature . Thus , I expect that my estimate 
of  the default  risk index used in the multiple regression analysis o f  
issue costs will explain a significant port ion o f  the inter-issu e  
variat ion of YOT . The emp irical results presented in Chapter 5 indi­
cate that the variable does perform wel l ,  obt aining the expected posi­
tive sign and high t values . 
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SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Firm =
-------------------------------------------------
Date of I ssue : _______________________ Type of Security : 
__
____________ 
_ 
Amount of I s sue : _____________________ Maturity Date : 
____
_____________ 
__ 
Interest Rat e :  
-----------------------
Investment Banker ' s  Fee : 
----------
Out of Pocke t Expenses ( including lawye r ' s fees) : _________________ 
__ 
Commi tment Dat e ( c ircle date) : 
------------------------------------
Call P rovisi on : Noncallable for ears . -----------------------� 
S inking Fund Provis ion : S inking fund begins in year ______ and ret ires 
____________ J ercent of the issue prior to maturity . 
APPENDIX C 
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TABLE 1 4  
SWITCH HITTER AND NON-SWITCH HITTER CHOICE CRITERIA 
ASSETS YRSPUB 
DRISK ( $b illion s )  (years)  S H  NSH 
- 1 . 24 0 . 83 7 X 
- 1 . 1 7 o .  7 2  2 X 
- 1 . 00 o .  7 2  2 X 
-0. 7 3  0 . 25 6 X 
-0 . 45 0 . 76 6 X 
-0 . 38 0 . 36 7 X 
-0 . 35 0 . 83 3 X 
-0. 20 0 . 83 3 X 
-0 . 06 1 . 65 3 X 
0 . 1 4  0 . 2 1 4 X 
0 . 2 9  2 . 01 3 X 
0 . 31 0 . 89 1 X 
0 . 35 0 . 1 6 2 1  X 
0 . 45 2 . 78 2 X 
0 . 45 2 . 78 2 X 
0 . 52 3 . 45 0 X 
0 . 5 7  0 . 6 1  1 X 
0 . 76 3 . 09 1 X 
0 . 84 3 . 1 7  3 X 
0 . 96 2 . 68 0 X 
1 . 03 3 . 45 5 X 
1 . 05 0 . 98 3 X 
1 . 1 9 2 . 48 1 X 
1 . 32 0 . 1 2 7 X 
1 . 5 1  3 . 78 2 X 
1 . 5 9  1 . 96 1 X 
1 . 60 3 . 34 2 X 
1 . 6 2  6 . 49 1 X 
1 . 68 3 . 09 1 X 
1 . 9 9  5 . 70 1 X 
1 . 9 9  5 . 70 1 X 
1 . 99 0 . 6 1  1 X 
2 . 02 2 . 93 1 X 
2 . 1 9  0 . 74 8 X 
2 . 33 7 . 59 0 X 
2 . 34 0 . 7 4 8 X 
2 . 36 0 . 1 2  3 X 
2 . 45 3 . 34 2 X 
2 . 48 7 . 59 0 X 
2 . 4 9  3 . 8 1 0 X 
2 . 53 6 . 87 0 X 
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TABLE 14  ( cont inued) 
AS SETS YRSPUB 
DRI SK ( $ b illions ) (years) SH NSH 
2 . 6 2 5 . 0 1 0 X 
2 . 9 4 5 . 25 8 X 
2 . 9 7 1 . 32 6 X 
3 . 3 2 5 . 5 3 0 X 
3 . 55 5 . 0 1  0 X 
3 . 88 0 . 0 3 25 X 
6 . 38 0 . 10 25 X 
8 . 4 3 0 . 1 6 1 0  X 
2 1 . 8 7 0 . 40 9 X 
2 2 . 0 2  0 . 40 9 X 
35 . 7 5 0 . 5 3 8 X 
4 1 . 34 0 . 0 1  * X 
49 . 64 1 . 1 9 6 X 
5 2 . 28 1 . 22 8 X 
5 2 . 3 3  l .  2 2  7 X 
5 2 . 35  1 . 22 7 X 
* 
This f i rm had no t is sued pub licly in over 30 years . 
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TABLE 1 5  
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
Correlations 
y X1  X2  X3  X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 
y 1 . 00 -0 . 1 4 -0 . 20 0 . 3 9 0 . 2 6 0 . 3 3 0 . 48 -0 . 20 -0 . 1 8 
X 1  1 . 00 0 . 08 0 . 24 0 . 23 0 . 04 0 . 04 0 . 09 0 . 1 0 
X2 1 . 00 -0 . 07 0 . 08 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 39 0 . 35 
X3  1 . 00 0 . 4 1 0 . 24 0 . 1 3 -0 . 1 1 -0 . 0 1  
X4 1 . 00 -0 . 06 0 . 08 o . ooa 0 . 1 9 
X5 1 . 00 0 . 1 4 -0 . 1 1 -0 . 1 2 
X6 1 . 00 -0 . 01 -0 . 02 
X7 1 . 00 0 . 86 
X8 1 . 00 
Y = YOT X 1  = CALL X2 SINK X3 = TREAS X4 = VOL 
X5 = SPREAD X6 = DRISK X7 = PRIV X8 = PRIV*VOL 
a C orrelation coefficient is less than 0 . 0 1 .  
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